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Bureau of Mines Information Circular/1986 



Field Tests of a Model Health and Safety 
Program for the Mining Industry 



By Robert H. Peters and Louis Schaffer 



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 



Information Circular 9075 
U 



Field Tests of a Model Health and Safety 
Program for the Mining Industry 



By Robert H. Peters and Louis Schaffer 




UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

Donald Paul Hodel, Secretary 

BUREAU OF MINES 
Robert C. Horton, Director 






Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 



Peters, Robert H. 

Field tests of a model health and safety program for the mining 
industry. 

(Information circular ; 9075) 

Bibliography: p. 29 

Supt. of Docs, no.: I 28,27; 9075. 

1. Miners-Diseases and hygiene. 2. Mine safety. I. Schaffer, Louis. 

I. Title. III. Series: Information circular (United States. Bureau of Mines) ; 9075. 



TN295.U4 



[RC965.M48] 



622 s [363. 1'19622] 



85-600313 




CONTENTS 

Page Page 

Abstract 1 Field evaluation of the model program 19 

Introduction 2 Mining company E 20 

Background research 2 Mining company W 22 

Definition of the model program 5 Work force comparisons 26 

Criteria 5 Work-related illnesses 27 

Fundamental conditions 5 Project overview 28 

Field evaluation plan 7 Conclusions 29 

Participating mining companies 8 References 29 

Mining company E 9 Appendix A. -Excerpts from tailored model pro- 
Mining company W 12 gram, company E 30 

The participation agreements 12 Appendix B. -Excerpts from tailored model program, 

Implementation of the model program 13 company W 32 

Mining company E 16 Appendix C. - Job performance sampling 34 

Mining company W 17 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

1 . Company E organization, beginning of 1982 10 

2. Company E organization, end of 1982 10 

3. Production operations of company E 11 

4. Company W organization, beginning of 1982 12 

5. Production operations of company W 13 

6. Reducing "unsafe conditions" 18 

7. Distribution of loss-control management effectiveness 19 

8. Distribution positions of companies E and W 20 

9. Proportion of jobs sampled at company E in which deficiency types P.,, P|„ P,., and P, were observed 21 

10. Job-deficiency 95-pct confidence limits for T at company E 21 

11. Monthly MSHA reportable injuries and illnesses at company E, 1982 22 

12. Monthly workdays missed by company E Employees because of work-related injuries, 1982 22 

13. Proportion of jobs sampled at company W in which deficiency types P.,, P|„ P,., and P, were observed 23 

14. Job-deficiency 95-pct confidence limits for T, at company W 23 

15. Monthly MSHA reportable injuries and illnesses at company W, 1982 24 

16. Monthly workdays missed by company W employees because of work-related injuries, 1982 24 

17. Equipment and/or facility damage accidents at company W, 1982 25 

TABLES 

1 . Sales needed to offset accident cost 16 

2. Simplified expected value calculation 16 

3. Job performance sampling results, company E 20 

4. Recommendations in tailored model for company E 21 

5. Job performance sampling results, mining company W 23 

6. Recommendations in tailored model for company W 23 

7. Accidents resulting in equipment and/or facility damage company W 25 

8. Expectation computation to add hydraulic pick and shovel to company W crusher 26 

9. Payback-period computation for hydraulic pick and shovel for company W crusher 26 

10. Overall absentee rates, 1982 27 

11. Work force turnover, 1982 27 

12. Claimed job-related illnesses, companies E and W 1982 27 



UNIT OF MEASURE ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT 


ft foot mt/h 


metric ton per hour- 


h hour oz 


ounce 


in inch oz/mt 


ounce per metric ton 


Ibf pound (force) pet 


percent 


min minute yr 


year 


mt metric ton 





FIELD TESTS OF A MODEL HEALTH AND SAFETY PROGRAM 

FOR THE MINING INDUSTRY 



By Robert H. Peters 1 and Louis Schaffer 2 



ABSTRACT 

The objective of the project descibed in this report was to design and field test a 
model health and safety program at a coal mining company and a gold mining company. 
The model program was implemented primarily by providing training on loss control, ac- 
cident investigation, and the operation of mobile equipment; and by providing technical 
assistance to help solve health and safety problems. Data were obtained from company 
records on occupational injuries, illnesses, accidents, and "near misses"; and through 
direct observation of employees performing a large number of randomly selected jobs. 
At the coal mine, employees were observed five times over a 15-month period. At the 
gold mine, employees were observed six times over a 16-month period. During the study, 
the percentage of sampled jobs containing one or more safety deficiencies decreased 
from 74.3 pet to 36.6 pet at the coal mine and from 86.4 pet to 19.1 pet at the gold mine. 
Work on this project was performed by Woodward Associates, Inc., under a Bureau of 
Mines contract. 

1 Research psychologist, I'ittsburgh Research Center, Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. 
; ' Research program manager. Carson Consultants, Genoa. NV. 



INTRODUCTION 



During the past 20 yr, significant progress has been 
made in the improvement of health and safety conditions in 
mining. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Acts 
were established in 1969 and 1977, and the mining industry 
has greatly increased its emphasis on health and safety. 
Nevertheless, mining is still recognized as an industry that 
has a high incidence of accidents and injuries. 

According to the National Safety Council (7), 3 the min- 
ing industry experienced 8.68 work injuries per 200,000 
employee-hours worked, compared to a 1979 all-industry 
average of 7.76. The incidence rate for bituminous coal was 
8.83, and for metal mining the rate was 12.27. 

These statistics show that further improvements must 
be made if mining is to be removed from the list of high-risk 
industries. More effective methods for reducing occupa- 
tional injuries and illnesses are needed. Therefore, the ob- 
jective of this research effort was to develop and field test a 
model health and safety program that will assist mine 
managers in concerted efforts to reduce accidents and 
health hazards in the mining industry. 

Most mining companies practice some form of accident 
prevention or reduction. The 1977 Health and Safety Act 
sets mandatory training standards for miners and requires 
mining companies to administer federally approved health 
and safety training programs, but there are no Federal 
guidelines for establishing and maintaining formal, com- 
prehensive health and safety programs. Many different 
methods and approaches are being used throughout the 
mining industry to reduce accidents, depending upon the 
size of the company, its labor force, and other available 
resources; type of mining technology and product; and 
management's attitude toward safety. However, little infor- 
mation exists as to which specific methods and approaches 
are effective. It was because of this lack of information that 
the Bureau of Mines contracted for the research described 
in this report. One of the overall goals was to better define 
the essential features of effective health and safety pro- 
grams for the mining industry. Therefore, the initial phase 
of this research was directed toward reviewing existing ac- 
cident reduction methods and approaches available in min- 
ing and other similarly hazardous industries, evaluating 



those methods or program elements, and recommending a 
comprehensive model program that could be used to im- 
prove health and safety throughout the mining industry. 
The intent was to identify and correctly define only those 
health and safety program elements that have proven to be 
successful and have the potential for universal application 
throughout the mining industry. The final phase of the 
research was to field test the model health and safety pro- 
gram at two mines. 

The project began in September 1980 and was com- 
pleted in April 1983. It consisted of a sequence of four 
research tasks, as follows: 

Task 1 . Generation of baseline data 

Task 2. Assessment of existing health and safety prac- 
tices 

Task 3. Development of a model health and safety pro- 
gram 

Task 4. Implementation and validation of the model 
health and safety program. 

Although the most salient results of tasks 1 and 2 are 
described in the next section, this report deals primarily 
with the results of tasks 3 and 4. For a complete account of 
the literature review and field observations that preceded 
the development of the model (tasks 1 and 2), see the final 
report on this project (2). 

This report includes a presentation of the most impor- 
tant findings from the literature review and field observa- 
tions, a description of the model program and a plan for 
evaluating it, an explanation of how the model program was 
implemented at two mining companies, a description of the 
results of more than a year of program evaluation, and 
recommendations and conclusions. The appendixes contain 
excerpts from the model programs tailored to each of the 
two mining companies and some examples of the job per- 
formance sampling data. 

This report is based on work performed by Woodward 
Associates, Inc., under Bureau contract HO308076. 



BACKGROUND RESEARCH 



This section describes the preliminary research that was 
conducted to gather background information prior to the ac- 
tual field implementation of the model health and safety 
program. 

The background research included - 

Several types of literature searches seeking material 
related to mining health and safety programs and recom- 
mended practices. 

Discussions with recognized experts in the mining safe- 
ty and health fields. 

Examination of available data on results acheived 
through various safety policies and practices. 

Observation anil assessment of health and safety 
management in mining and in two other industries with 
some similar equipment and job hazards. 



i nderlined numbers in parentheses refer in items in the list of references 
preceding appendix A. 



These activities are discussed in detail in the final report (2). 
Here, only the findings that had a significant influence on 
the definition of model program are briefly discussed. 

The majority of safety management books reviewed, 
and many of the articles by safety experts in professional 
journals, emphasize that workplace safety and work force 
health are management responsibilities like all other respon- 
sibilities related to the business enterprise. Petersen (.>') 
notes that one principle is perhaps more important than any 
of the others: Safety should be managed like any other com- 
pany function. The field observations made by the resear- 
chers as part of task 1 affirmed this principle. The mining 
operations that had the safest working conditions and the 
greatest degree of worker conformance to safe work prac- 
tices were those operations in which safety was managed 
like any other company function and all of the company 
functions were managed well. There were a few operations 
in which safety and all other company functions were 
managed poorly. The majority of the operations observed 



did not treat safety and health in the same way as other 
functions. Usually these matters had a lower management 
priority and seemed to be viewed as a cost of doing business, 
like taxes, or as ways to comply with government regula- 
tions, rather than as opportunities to improve productivity 
and profit. 

If safety and health are to be managed in the same man- 
ner as other company functions, it follows that safety and 
health rules and procedures should be defined and enforced 
in the same way as other kinds of rules and procedures that 
regulate the company's activities. Some of the safety 
literature emphasizes this point. Chapman (4), a safety 
engineer for Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., has stated this 
point clearly: "Let's stop thinking about 'how to do the job' 
and 'safety' as separate processes. Think only of 'how to do 
the job the right way,' and be sure the safety rules for that 
job are fully integrated into all training and are enforced no 
differently than other procedure rules." 

Although some of the mining companies observed had 
taken small steps in the direction of fully integrated work 
and safety rules and procedures, most had taken no steps at 
all. Several had no written rules other than the safety rules. 
The idea of fully integrated work and safety rules is not 
reflected in the policies commonly found in the mining in- 
dustry. In contrast, fully integrated work and safety rules 
are accepted as "the only way" in industrial and governmen- 
tal organizations for jobs in which an accident could produce 
disastrous results. Space; nuclear power; air transportation; 
military air, undersea, and missile operations; and surgery 
and medicine are among the industries and activities in 
which there are many jobs with fully integrated safety rules 
and procedures. Hammer (5), a well-know aerospace safety 
expert, has identified certain criteria to be observed in the 
preparation of safety rules. One criterion is that "safety 
rules for a particular operation and for the workers involved 
should be included in the procedures for the conduct of that 
operation." Examination of several aerospace operator's 
manuals indicated that this criterion was satisfied. Ex- 
amination of job procedure manuals prepared by a few 
large, progressive mining companies indicated that this 
criterion was also satisfied in those manuals. However, 
among the operations observed, the usual situation was that 
work procedures and safety rules were separately 
developed and separately taught. Only in enforcement was 
full integration observed -and then only at the job super- 
vison or section supervisor level. 

Both field observations and the research literature sug- 
gest that one of the fundamental conditions for an effective 
health and safety program is full integration with all work 
procedures and rules. Without such integration, truly effec- 
tive management of safety and health is unnecessarily dif- 
ficult- perhaps impossible. 

Among. the companies observed, some had good safety 
and health conditions and no safety officer. Some had poor 
safety and health conditions and no safety officer. Some had 
good conditions and a safety officer, and some had poor con- 
ditions and a safety officer. It was evident that the presence 
of a safety officer, by itself, had very little to do with the 
safety and health results achieved. In the context of total 
loss control management, the safety office itself would have 
to be considered a loss at a few of the mining companies 
visited. Money was being spent for something that was not 
being received. 

Partlow (6) notes that 25 or 30 years ago it was not 
unusual to find that the safety practitioner had the job 
because he or she had been injured on his or her previous 



job. At one mining company, the employee relations 
manager was asked how the company's safety official was 
selected. He replied that the employee had been hurt in an 
accident and that "there wasn't any other job he could do 
here." This suggests that management was not handling 
well the management functions of planning, organizing, 
staffing, direction, and control with respect to safety and 
health. Furthermore, the top manager was doing a poor job 
of demonstrating his interest in, and commitment to, job 
safety - a commitment he had announced publicly in a policy 
letter several months earlier. Other responses to questions 
about how the safety official was chosen included the follow- 
ing: 

He had some spare time in his job as supply clerk, and 
he had served as a sergeant in the military service. 

He used to be a policeman. 

We wanted to keep him as a junior geologist, but he 
wasn't satisfied with his pay. We were able to increase his 
pay by assigning him additional responsibilities in safety. 

We decided to have a safety man and to fill the job inter- 
nally. He was the best of the three who were considered. 

We hired him as kind of a management trainee. The 
safety job is a good place for him to get an overall view of 
the operation. 

He was a security guard who did a good job. He wanted 
to improve himself so he asked to be promoted to safety. 
He's really not our safety officer because we don't have one 
authorized. He's called a "safety technician." 

He has some college and he speaks Spanish, so he can 
talk to some of our miners who can't speak English. 

It is of fundamental importance to the attainment and 
maintenance of good safety arid health conditions that the 
top managers regularly show subordinate supervisors and 
workers that safety and health are among the primary 
management concerns. Management can demonstrate in- 
terest and commitment in many ways; however, any way 
chosen must satisfy a basic criterion: It must be convincing 
to the supervisors and workers. How these people perceive 
management's concern is important. If the manifestations 
of management interest and commitment are perceived as 
artificial or insincere, their effect on the attitudes and 
behavior of the work force is negative rather than positive. 
Sometimes, well-intentioned and customary ways of 
demonstrating management concern fail. Chapman (4) il- 
lustrates this point with an anecdote about three teenagers 
at a National Safety Congress session: 

When asked if they would read a safety rule 
pamphlet given to them by their boss, these 
young people said probably not. If the boss 
wanted them to understand and follow the 
rules, they should be explained face to face. If 
no more interest in their safety was shown than 
just handing them a pamphlet, they wouldn't 
think their boss regarded safety as very impor- 
tant, so neither would they. 

One of the most convincing ways a top manager can 
manifest concern for effective safety and health manage- 
ment is to have all subordinate supervisors properly 
educated in safety and health management. Why then is it 
that most of the supervisors in the mines observed were not 
so educated? The probable explanation is that most of the 
top managers were not themselves formally prepared to 



manage safety and health matters. The majority of them 
were mining engineers or graduates in some other engineer- 
ing discipline. Interviews with them about their 
backgrounds in safety and health indicated that they had 
very limited education, and no direct experience, in these 
matters. In light of the importance of health and safety to 
productivity and profits in mining ventures, it appears that 
the training of most mining industry professionals in these 
matters is insufficient. As a result, safety officers often 
have poorly defined duties and, as previously indicated, are 
selected with little regard for qualifications. Supervisors 
under such managers generally do not seek to acquire 
special skills in the health and safety area on their own ini- 
tiative. 

If the top manager has properly executed the planning, 
organizing, and staffing functions related to safety and 
health, the direction and control functions are made much 
easier. This is especially true if the organizational arrange- 
ment makes all supervisors fully accountable for safety and 
health in their departments. This arrangement was a promi- 
nent feature of the mining operations that were observed to 
have the best safety and health conditions. 

In the discussion above, the phrase "good safety and 
health conditions" is used several times without defining 
what "good" means in this context. Specific evaluative con- 
siderations are discussed in the "Field Evaluation Plan" sec- 
tion. It is sufficient here to note several points that are basic 
to the selection of a rreasurement for determining the 
"goodness" of health and safety conditions: 

A measurement designed to record personal injury ex- 
perience is not necessarily a sound way to measure safety 
performance. 

The occurrence of accidents is a probabilistic 
phenomenon. Management actions that reduce the prob- 
ability of accident occurrence cannot reduce the probability 
to zero. 

Accidents that produce personal injuries do not 
necessarily result in a larger total cost to a mining enter- 
prise than those that do not. In most mining operations, the 
noninjury accidents are far more numerous and their total 
cost is larger. 

As much or more can be learned about accident reduc- 
tion from accidents that "almost occurred" - that is, "near 
misses" -as can be learned from accidents that actually oc- 
curred (those that are required to be reported to the govern- 
ment). 

Contrary to popular belief, it is not true that "unsafe 
acts" are the cause of 80 to 90 pet of all accidents in mining. 
The reasons for accident occurrence are much more com- 
plex. 

The literature review and discussions with experts 
brought forth a great many ideas that might be candidates 
for inclusion in a model health and safety program. Nearly 
every safety practicioner and author had some favorite 
technique to which he gave credit for whatever accident 
reduction had been achieved. Often data were presented to 
show that a reduction in the "MSHA 4 incidence rate" had 
been experienced during a specified period. Aside from 
questions about the statistical accuracy and significance of 
the data, the precise relationship of the data to the variable 
under consideration could not be determined. It is a rare 
case when only one element of a company's safety program 
is altered and the program then remains unchanged for 
even as long as a year. Nearly every program element 



Mine Safety and Health Administration. 



alteration or innovation is accompanied by a great many 
other changes, both obvious and subtle, during its im- 
plementation. Even when the variable can be "isolated," 
there may still be questions about the phenomenon that pro- 
duced the result. For example, was it the physical improve- 
ment of a work area that reduced accidents or was it the so- 
called "Hawthorne effect"? That is, did the specific physical 
improvements induce the recorded improvements in work 
behavior, or did the work behavior results occur because of 
the workers' response to management's increased attention 
to them and their workplace conditions? That is, might the 
results have been the same with entirely different physical 
improvements? 

For almost every safety improvement method ad- 
vocated by some practicioner, expert, or author, there could 
be found someone else with apparently equal credentials to 
impugn the method. For example, there are many advocates 
of safety contests. Crapnell (7) declares that "safety contests 
and promotions can make safety fun -no small accomplish- 
ment in itself." He also quotes a remark concerning "safety 
bingo" made by a manager of industrial relations: "(It) 
creates tremendous peer pressure for workers to perform 
their jobs safely." These statements are representative of 
many made by persons who use and endorse safety contests. 
Others raise some questions that the contest advocates 
usually do not address. Gilmore (8) observes that the per- 
formance of a plant or work group "cannot really be com- 
pared" to that of another plant or work group. Instead, the 
plant or work group "can show improvement only as it im- 
proves its own experience." Of course, contests can be 
designed so that winning requires the greatest improve- 
ment in the group's own experience record. Accurate 
measurement is necessary, but difficult to achieve. Gilmore 
points out that "meaningful measurement depends on the 
sincere desire to learn the truth and is hindered by the 
desire to appear safer than someone else in a contest situa- 
tion." Hampton (9) observes that, although contests often 
achieve the intended result, they also produce many 
unintended results. After citing several actual example, he 
states, "Neglect, conflict and dishonesty are among the prin- 
cipal side effects of contests. Through defects in design and 
implementation, contests can implicitly reward activities in- 
consistent with organizational goals." 

The use of safety committees is another practice that 
some safety experts recommend and others discourage. 
Mims (10) writes, "I have found worker safety committees 
the most practical way to foster genuine grassroots con- 
cerns with safety -the 'they is us' attitude ... it spreads this 
feeling of responsibility and safety awareness to every 
worker who is serving on it or has served on it in the past." 
However, DeReamer (70) opposes the use of safety commit- 
tees, arguing, "Their basic principle -dispersing respon- 
sibility -simply does not work where safety and health is 
concerned. Employee participation in safety is essential, but 
there are better ways than committees to achieve it." 

In the early part of the background research it seemed 
appropriate to attempt to select for the model program 
those practices that were favored by the preponderance of 
available experience, information, evidence, and opinion or 
supported by especially impressive data. However, soon it 
became evident that this was not appropriate because - 

However successful a given safety improvement is for 
one or several mining enterprises, it will not necessarily be a 
sound method in all. 

Field observations indicated that very different sets of 
methods produced similar results at different mines, if both 
sets were carefully managed. 



Interviews with experts and field observations led to the 
conclusion that no single improvement method was essen- 
tial in a model program to attain and maintain good safety 
and health conditions. 



What is essential in a model health and safety program for 
mines is for management to create and sustain a few fun- 
damental conditions. 



DEFINITION OF THE MODEL PROGRAM 



This section describes the criteria established for a 
model health and safety program and then defines the 
model program in terms of five fundamental conditions. 

CRITERIA 

The background research work suggested that the 
model program should satisfy the following criteria in order 
to be effective and acceptable to mining industry managers: 

1 . The model must be readily adaptable to all types and 
sizes of mines in the coal, metal, and nonmetal mining in- 
dustries. 

2. The model should identify all of the essential features 
for illness and injury reduction effectiveness. All of the 
essential features are required so that the scope of the 
model is well known at the beginning of implementation and 
so that the evaluation does not show an unfavorable result 
because of program incompleteness. Nonessential features 
should not be included in the model; they can make the 
model less acceptable to mine management and the evalua- 
tion confusing. 

3. The model program must be manageable in ways that 
are compatible with the management concepts that are 
customary in the United States. This criterion addresses 
especially the avoidance of "intervention mechanisms" that 
require the services of specialists or alter the accountability 
structure of an organization. The reason for this criterion is 
primarily to improve the probability of obtaining the 
cooperation of mining companies in evaluating and, later, 
adopting the model. 

4. The loss reductions attainable through the model pro- 
gram implementation must exceed the cost of the implemen- 
tation. In 1981-82, the state of the national economy and of 
the mining economy in particular was such that few mining 
companies would have been likely to consider any new pro- 
gram unless there was an expectation of a reasonable return 
on any investment required to implement the program. 
Safety and health matters are more likely to be dealt with 
effectively if increased profit is the expected result. 

5. The model program should be acceptable to manage- 
ment and labor on its merits alone. No inducement to adopt 
the program should be necessary, other than the expecta- 
tion of reduced losses due to accidents and illness. Model 
program acceptance should be entirely voluntary. 



FUNDAMENTAL CONDITIONS 

There are many ways in which a model program might 
be described or defined. The way chosen was to define the 
model program in terms of a small number of fundamental 
conditions. All of the conditions can be created and main- 
tained by competent managers in the performance of the 
normal functions of management. 

In framing the model, the research team considered 
rather carefully what "normal functions of management" 



means. There are hundreds of management and business 
administration textbooks and articles that list and explain 
management functions. One of the most useful lists is 
presented by Dale (11). Dale identifies and discusses seven 
functions of management: 

Planning 

Organizing 

Staffing 

Direction 

Control 

Innovation 

Representation 

Dale's list is especially appropriate to mining management 
because it includes the functions of innovation and represen- 
tation-functions not included in many other management 
function listings. Innovation is especially important in min- 
ing. Dale notes that management is "a creative rather than 
adaptive task" - a concept entirely consistent with the model 
program concepts. 

Some methods of defining the model that were con- 
sidered created problems in satisfying one criterion or 
another. Satisfying the first and third criterion required the 
rejection of several ideas for model program features 
because the ideas were too specific to be acceptable (or 
useful) to small mines. For examples, many of the experts 
interviewed advocated a particular organizational pattern 
for the mine safety office, including a full-time safety of- 
ficial. A typical small mine management would not feel that 
it could afford the arrangement advocated or that the ar- 
rangement was needed. In other words, the small mine 
management could not foresee a satisfactory return on the 
investment. The managements of some medium-size mines 
(say, 50 to 100 miners), and some larger ones as well, might 
also oppose the arrangement on the grounds that a same, or 
better, return would be available through a smaller invest- 
ment. 

Another example relates to a proposed model program 
feature that called for regularly scheduled safety meetings 
at all levels. It was rejected because it was inconsistent with 
the first fundamental condition (explained below) and 
because of a particular finding during the field observations. 
A mine shift foreman expressed his strong opposition to 
safety meetings, saying that they were largely a waste of 
time that they were "rituals" which "gave safety a bad 
name," and that they dealt publicly with matters which, in 
his opinion, could be dealt with effectively only in private, 
one-on-one, supervisory actions. Later it was observed that 
this foreman had superior safety performance on his shift, 
as well as an excellent production record. He never con- 
ducted formal or informal safety meetings; and some of his 
subordinates, with a mixture of amusement and admiration, 
said they had never heard him use the word "safety." Safety 
meetings were not essential in this operation. There are 
many ways to deal effectively with safety training and safe 
work performance. 



No Separation of Production and Health and 
Safety 

There must be no separation of production and safety 
and health in the management of the mining operations. The 
best "safety program" is none at all -that is, there is no 
management activity that is separate and distinct from pro- 
duction management. "Built-in" safety and health should be 
evident in every work aspect at every level. 

Probably the best way to assure that safety and health 
are integral to all production tasks is to prepare complete 
written work descriptions, or "safe job procedures," that 
define the right way to do each task. These are developed 
through job safety analyses, methods engineering, worker's 
suggestions, various industrial standards, and equipment 
manufacturer's recommendations. They are designed to 
guide the training and supervision of workers. If they are to 
be effective, these descriptions cannot be mere "read-and- 
sign" documents designed primarily to "prove" that the 
worker was trained in case of an accident. 

The most important prerequisite for attaining this fun- 
damental condition is that each employee must be provided 
with precise and comprehensive instructions concerning the 
proper performance of his or her job, with the instructiions 
taking into account safety as well as other issues. Assuming 
that employees accept and follow these instructions, and 
that management is properly performing its other normal 
functions (i.e., planning, organizing, and directing), the 
achievement of this fundamental conditions should require 
no additional investments. 

Honest Commitment to Health and Safety 

There must be an honest commitment by the top 
managers to constantly improve the operation's health and 
safety performance. This commitment must not only exist, 
it must be regularly demonstrated. Lippert (12) states, ". . . 
to the extent that the chief executive perceives that 'a safe 
operation' is important in fulfilling his role, to that extent 
will safety have importance in the perception of the lower 
levels of management and supervision." Frequently the 
safety literature cites the need for the top manager to sup- 
port the safety department, but such support is not an im- 
pressive manifestation of the manager's commitment in the 
eyes of the workers. The safety department should be 
devoted to supporting the top manager, who should be 
leading the way by precept, encouragement and example. 
With regard to leading by example, Shaw (13) writes, "If, on 
an underground inspection, a manager or supervisor passes 
an unsafe condition with no comment and then raises cain 
over production, no amount of later talking about safety is 
going to convince the workers that he or she is really com- 
mitted to safety. Therefore, step one in getting safety is the 
commitment from management." 

Several authors have pointed out that failure of upper 
level managers to effectively demonstrate their commit- 
ment to safety, as perceived by the first-level supervisor, 
will result in the failure of a safety program. Walters (U) 
writes: 

The firstline supervisor tries to do what is 
requested by his supervisor, but if the 
secondline supervision and other supervision at 
higher levels do not act in a manner that sup- 
ports what they say, then the firstline super- 
visor soon notes this and governs himself accor- 
dingly. As a result, the time and expense 



devoted to any program is often wasted. In 
many cases it is the second level of supervision 
on up that causes the failure of the otherwise 
successful and well designed policy. 
Every manager and supervisor must accept that he or 
she is perforce the principal safety official for those ac- 
tivities under his or her supervision and that he or she must 
constantly act in a manner that reflects dedication to proper 
performance of that responsibility. Representation, direc- 
tion, and control are the key management functions perti- 
nent to this fundamental condition. 

Management Health and Safety Training 

Managers and supervisors at all levels must receive basic 
training in safety and health (more broadly, loss control) 
management and additional periodic courses to update and 
upgrade their training in more advanced management 
techniques. All managers and supervisors must thoroughly 
understand the costs of occupational illnesses and injuries, 
and accidents that result in equipment and facility damage. 
They must be able to correctly relate these costs to produc- 
tivity and profit losses in the operations for which they have 
responsibility. A working knowledge of countermeasures to 
reduce the probability of these losses is necessary, including 
mastery of simple analyses of cost-to-loss reduction relation- 
ship. They must learn to view accidents and job-related ill- 
nesses and injuries as failures of management to adequately 
perform one or more of the management functions. In par- 
ticular, they must recognize that properly training their 
subordinates is always a major part of the management 
functions of direction and control. Many task training needs 
(identified as part of establishing the first fundamental con- 
dition) require careful supervisory planning and innovation. 
These essential training activities are usually done properly 
only by managers who are themselves properly trained. 
However, training, no matter how intensive and thorough, 
cannot by itself reduce the probability of accidents to accept- 
able levels. Counter-measure training of managers must in- 
clude demonstrations and practice in the reduction of 
workplace safety and health hazards -that is, the 
technology as well as analyses of alternatives in cost-versus- 
benefit terms. Management training also must show the 
manager that the Federal 30 CFR standards and State 
standards should not consitute a set of management goals, 
but rather, in general, only a minimum foundation. Finally, 
the manager must understand that there are some 
(although few) attractive safety practices or counter- 
measures that are simply too expensive to implement. There 
are sometimes advantages in accepting risks -but this will 
never be true if the degree of risk being accepted is not 
accurately known. 

Management Emphasis on Health and Safety in 
Organizing and Staffing Functions 

Managers must include special emphasis on health and 
safety in their performance of the organizing and staffing 
functions. Job-selection processes should include thorough 
evaluation of employment experience, accident and injury 
history, physical condition, and learning disabilities and any 
other handicap. Safety and health risks to handicapped per- 
sons and to their employer should be controlled by identify- 
ing handicaps accurately and defining training, job 
assignments, and appropriate performance restrictions ac- 
cordingly. Periodic performance evaluation (a control activi- 
ty within the staffing function) must include a loss control 



component commensurate with loss control elements that 
should be included in work descriptions such as those men- 
tioned in the discussion of the first fundamental condition. 
Employees unable to meet sensible performance standards 
after corrective retraining, closer supervision, and counsel- 
ing must be reassigned or discharged. Periodic organiza- 
tional analysis should be conducted to evaluate the organiza- 
tional structure and the jobs that comprise it in terms of the 
current and near-future goals and standards of the mining 
enterprise. Organization should be dynamic. Like the people 
in it, it needs correction and redirection from time to time. 

Reliable Feedback Mechanisms 

There are several reliable feedback mechanisms that 
have reliable and readily detectable safety and health com- 
ponents. One of the most important of these is the investiga- 
tion of all accidents and "near misses" using a method 
designed to identify all factors that may have contributed to 
the event. ("Accident" is defined as any event that produces 
an unplanned cost.) Information from such investigations 
provides management with knowledge about the effective- 
ness of training, hazard removal, and any other actions that 
may have been taken to improve safety. It also identifies ac- 
tions that need to be taken in the future. The "near miss" is 
an equal, or better, information source than an accident. 
Palisano (15) reports that Exxon Corp. has very successfully 



used a near-miss investigation program to reduce accidents. 
The near-miss information is published in newsletters and 
used to reenact some of the near-misses for video taping in- 
struction material. 

Another very valuable feedback or control mechanism is 
the safety and health inspection. These inspections may be 
done in many ways. Jones (16) reports on a safety audit 
technique used by Allied Chemical Corp. It measured 
employee compliance with safety rules; unsafe acts, condi- 
tions, and equipment; and the health and safety environ- 
ment of the plant. The top manager, superintendent, super- 
visor, and safety officer took part in a twice-monthly audit 
of the 3,000-employer plant. The audit technique, like the 
near-miss investigations, provides information about the 
status of earlier safety and health improvements and the 
need for new improvement actions. 

There are many other feedback methods that produce 
good results in some mines (job-performance sampling, 
which is discussed later, is an example), but the two 
methods discusssed above can be effective in any mining 
operation -especially if they include the participation of ap- 
propriately selected members of the work force. Whatever 
the methods, they must incorporate accurate records, main- 
tained with care and available for examination by anyone in 
the workforce. This last fundamental condition is essentially 
an element of the control function, but it also involves the 
planning, organizing, staffing, and representation func- 
tions. 



FIELD EVALUATION PLAN 



Gilmore (8) notes that "... loss control is the art of at- 
taining the optimum balance of loss potential, loss probabili- 
ty and profit." The fundamental conditions discussed in the 
previous section describe, collectively, the management en- 
vironment that makes practice of the art of loss control 
most effective. It would have been desirable, if it had been 
possible, to evaluate the model health and safety program in 
terms of objective measurements of loss potential, loss prob- 
ability, and profit. However, for a variety of reasons, such 
direct measurements were not possible. 

It was decided that the evaluation plan should include con- 
siderations such as - 

Ease of implementation and administration- A 

measure of the simplicity, or lack of it, in setting up the pro- 
gram and running it on a continuing basis. 

Cost effectiveness - A measure of both the initial installa- 
tion costs and ongoing costs as compared to the program's 
effectiveness in reducing accidents and injuries. 

Acceptability- A measure of the willingness of labor and 
management to use the new program. > 

Compatibility -A measure of how well the program fits 
into the existing overall mine situation. 

Some comments about these considerations will help the 
reader relate them to the evaluation methods planned for 
actual use in the field. 

It was concluded that there would be no way to measure 
acceptability except in a subjective way -that is, by using 
anecdotal data from the mining companies that agreed to 
allow field implementation and evaluation in their opera- 
tions. The fact that they agreed indicates acceptability by 
management, and an expectation that the work force would 
find the model program acceptable too. Although some min- 
ing companies declined the invitation to participate in this 



study, none of them gave as reasons anything that sug- 
gested management found the model unacceptable. 

The compatibility measure, it was decided, would also 
have to be made from anecdotal data -or perhaps from the 
lack of such data. Since, as several mining executives noted, 
the model program dealt with "getting managers to do what 
they should have been doing all along," it was believed that 
compatibility would not be a problem except with respect to 
those managers who might simply resist change -any 
change. 

The ease of implementation and administration 
measurement could be made satisfactorily by compiling a 
list of recommended actions to implement the model pro- 
gram, discussing them with the top manager and recording 
his or her decision concerning each action, and observing 
and rating the progress made over a reasonable period of 
time. This technique is explained in more detail in the sec- 
tion on program implementation and appendixes A and B. 

The cost effectiveness measure was more difficult, 
especially the determination of accident and injury reduc- 
tion effectiveness. During the field observations, it ap- 
peared that only about 5 pet of the mining operations visited 
recorded and reported accidents and injuries exactly as re- 
quired by 30 CFR 50. Based on the field observations, it was 
judged that the mining companies that agreed to participate 
in the evaluation might not have good records of accidents 
and injuries (as those terms are defined in 30 CFR 50) and 
would not have reported as required by 30 CFR 50. In other 
words, it was anticipated that there would be no suitable 
baseline data available. (There was a high correlation be- 
tween good record keeping and correct reporting and the 
quality of safety and health management. The companies 
with good records and correct reports probably would not 
be candidates for participation in the model program, since 



they would not see a need for improvement.) It is a part of 
the last fundamental condition that accurate records be kept 
of all injuries and all accidents, not just those defined in 30 
CFR 50, and of near misses as well. If this condition was in- 
troduced during program implementation and maintained 
during evaluation, it was considered very likely that more 
accidents would be recorded and reported than in the 
previous year, even if fewer actually occurred. In addition, 
the probabilistic nature of accidents makes it possible that 
there could be more accidents in one short period of time 
than in a second similar period, even though the first period 
has a lower mean probability of accidents. However, a sus- 
tained reduction of the mean probability of accidents (and 
illnesses) will reduce the long-term accident risk. 

One very useful way to judge whether the mean prob- 
ability of accidents is being reduced is to use a job perfor- 
mance sampling technique. The sampling procedure is a 
form of inspection. If conducted properly, it not only pro- 
vides feed back, but also an opportunity for a management 
person to demonstrate concern for safety and health in a 
very favorable setting: one-on-one communication at the 
employee's usual workplace. A job performance sampling 
procedure was designed expressly for the model program 
evaluation. Through observation of a randomly selected 
sample of jobs, the procedure provided a basis for 
estimating the proportion of the work force that was work- 
ing with- 

Individual job performance deficiencies that could be 
corrected by the employee alone (P A ), or 

Individual job performance deficiencies that could be 
corrected only through employer action beyond the control 
of the individual employee (P B ), or 

Deficiencies that were common to several jobs of the 
same kind, or various kinds, and correctable only through 
substantial changes by the employer in the mining plan, 
operating policies, or job structuring (P c ). 

The sampling process is explained in more detail in the sec- 
tion on implementation and in appendix C. 

A second measure related to cost effectiveness is the 
change in the slope of the cumulative cost of accidents, ill- 
nesses, and injuries curve, from the beginning of the pro- 
gram implementation through the evaluation period. 



Decreases in the slope indicate that losses are costing less. 
Unfortunately, it was not expected that all loss data would 
be available at the beginning. It was estimated that several 
months of training and other management actions would be 
necessary before all losses could be estimated with 
reasonable accuracy. However, there is one element of loss 
data that seemed likely to be available for all the mines from 
the payroll records: records of work days lost due to work 
injuries or illnesses. This statistic is certainly not an ac- 
ceptable surrogate for the total cost of accidents, injuries, 
and illnesses or even for the total cost of work injuries and 
illnesses, but it is likely to be a dependable indicator of the 
trend in those statistics. 

A third measure related to cost effectiveness is the "ex- 
pectation calculation for various health and safety manage- 
ment improvements. It can be used to evaluate the "worth," 
that is, expected return on investment, of hazard 
countermeasures, production practice changes, and injury 
or severity reduction methods. The "expectation" is a 
representation of the fact that if two or more possible, 
mutually exclusive events or outcomes can be expressed as 
numerical values, and each can be assigned a probability of 
occurrence, the "expected value" of a trial is the sum of the 
value of each event multiplied by its probability. In short, 
the "expectation" of the outcome of a chance process is the 
weighted average of all values of the variable, that is, the 
arithmetic mean. The "expectation" can be expressed 
mathematically as follows: 



E(x) = E Xi r, 



where 



and 



E(x) = expectation, 
n = number of outcomes, or "eventualities," 
Xj = cost of eventuality i, 
Pi = probability of eventuality i. 



Application of this calculation is explained in the section on 
program implementation. 



PARTICIPATING MINING COMPANIES 



Consideration of possible sites for model program im- 
plementation and evaluation began during the field research 
observations (task 2). The following conditions for evalua- 
tion mines were established: 

Two mine sites should be evaluated, an underground 
coal mine and mine of a different type in a different part of 
the country. 

The minimum employment at each mine should be approx- 
imately 100 persons. 

The mines should have significant, but not atypical, safety 
problems. 

There was another condition that took precedence over all 
of the others: The managements of the candidate mines 
would have to be willing to participate in the model program 
evaluation. 

Fifteen mines were identified as candidate evaluation 
sites. These were either mines that were known to members 



of the research team through work on other projects or 
mines that were recommended by MSHA mine inspectors 
who knew about the model program and whose recom- 
mendations had been sought by the researchers. From the 
15 candidate mines, the researchers chose 8 to be invited 
and encouraged to become participants in the field evalua- 
tion processes. Each of these eight mines received a detailed 
explanation of the model program and the implementation 
and evaluation plans. Each also received a formal letter that 
defined the cooperative arrangement proposed and re- 
quested a favorable response. Two mines never responded 
at all. Two others responded with polite, detailed explana- 
tions of their reasons for declining to participate. The 
reasons had to do mostly with programs of their own, or of 
their parent companies, which had been recently introduced 
to improve their health and safety performance. The re- 
searchers withdrew the invitation to one mine when they 
learned of some management problems that appeared to 
make an agreeable arrangement unlikely. After 2 months. 



the total number of mines still considering participation, 
and being considered by the researchers, had been reduced 
to three. Finally, agreements were made with two com- 
panies, a coal mining company in the East and a metal min- 
ing company in the West. They are referred to in this report 
as company E and company W and are described in the next 
two sections. The third company was, by mutual under- 
standing, left as a "standby" in the event there were unan- 
ticipated serious implementation problems at company E or 
company W. 

MINING COMPANY E 

The offices and mines of company E are in eastern Ken- 
tucky. The nearest city with emergency medical service and 
a hospital is Pineville, approximately 15 miles distant. 

The company's product is steam coal. The mining opera- 
tions include both underground and surface mines and, 
since 1982, a contractor-operated thin-seam miner. 

There are two underground mines within a mile or so of 
the company offices. The newest began production in 1982. 
Both are "low coal" drift mines using continuous miners and 
working a seam that has an average thickness of approx- 
imately 40 in. There are two surface mining locations (but 
only one MSHA identification number for both). Mountain- 
top removal characterizes most of company E's surface min- 
ing. 

All coal hauling from the mines to the crusher, prepara- 
tion plant, or holding area is done by a contractor. 

Company E operates a preparation plant, a clean coal 
crusher, and a tipple, at which unit trains, usually of about 
70 cars, are loaded for shipment. 

The principal production machines in use at the begin- 
ning of 1982 are listed below. 5 

Underground 

4 Joy 14 CM4-11 AH continuous miners 

5 Long Airdox LRB-15A roof bolters 

3 Galis 300 roof bolters 

1 Wilcox WRDA-5500 roof bolter 

4 Joy 21 SC2 shuttle cars 

4 Joy 18 SC-7HE shuttle cars 

2 NMS rock dusters 

6 S and S rock dusters 

4 MSA Bantam 400 rock dusters 

6 S and S 74SS mine scoops 

3 S and S BM-100 mine tractors 

7 Kersey BJD mine tractors 
2 Rail Runner locomotives 

4 Stamler BF-17 feeder breakers 
4 Long-Airdox conveyors 

10 Kersey 600 CTT supply trailers 



■Id Tcrt'iiee in specific products dues nol imply endorsement hy ihr Bureau 
if Mines. 



Surface 

1 Bucyrus-Erie 480W dragline 

1 Galion 125 crane 

5 Caterpillar D9H tractor-bulldozers 

1 Caterpillar D9G tractor-bulldozer 

1 Caterpillar D8K tractor-bulldozer 

1 Caterpillar D7G tractor-bulldozer 

3 Komatsu D355A tractor-bulldozers 

2 Komatsu D85E tractor-bulldozers 

2 Caterpillar 992B loaders, rubber tired 

3 Caterpillar 992C loaders, rubber tired 
3 Caterpillar 988B loaders, rubber tired 

2 Caterpillar 980B loaders, rubber tired 

3 Caterpillar 966C loaders, rubber tired 
1 Caterpillar 955 loader, crawler 

1 Deere 700A tractor 

1 Deere 510 backhoe 

1 Caterpillar 637 scraper 

1 Caterpillar 16G motor grader 

2 Caterpillar 14G motor graders 
2 Wabco 85C rock trucks 

8 Caterpillar 773 rock trucks 

2 Euclid R50 rock trucks 

1 Caterpillar 769 water wagon 
1 Mack DM685S water wagon 

3 Ingersoll Rand T-4 drills 

1 Ingersoll ECM 250 Air Trac drill 

1 Ingersoll D150 compressor 

1 Robbins RR10HD drill 

2 Powder trucks 

4 ANFO trucks 

In 1982, company E's total salable production of coal 
was nearly 800,000 mt, of which 65 pet was from surface 
operations. Approximately 12 million mt of overburden was 
moved. 

The organization of company E at the beginning of 1982 is 
shown in figure 1. In May of 1982, some major organiza- 
tional changes were made. The principal one, in terms of ef- 
fect on the model health and safety program, was the crea- 
tion of an additional level of management: a production 
manager, a maintenance manager, and a safety and loss 
control foreman, all reporting directly to the top manager. 
The new organization is shown in figure 2. 

At the beginning of 1982, the total number of company 
E employees was 362. At the end of the year, the total was 
318. The change was due primarily to layoffs in the under- 
ground mines as the number of sections was decreased. 
Average employment was 340. All of the hourly employees, 
except the security guards, are represented by a union local. 

Figure 3 diagrams the major production operations of 
company E. Not shown are the pond construction and main- 
tenance activities and other pollution controls. Also not 
shown is the thin-seam miner, which is provided and 
operated by a second contractor. 



10 



Underground 

master 

mechanic 



General 
manager 



Assistant 
general manager 

and 
mining engineer 



Engineering 

and 
survey crews 



Purchasing 
agent 



Drill 
foreman 



Underground 
superintendent 



Office 
manager 



Safety 
office 



Blasting 
foreman 



General crew 
foreman 



Surface mine 
foreman 



General 
foreman 



General 
foreman 



Shift 
foreman 



Shift 
foreman 



Surface mine 
foreman 



Shift 
foremon 



Shift 
foreman 



Surface 

master 

mechanic 



Shift 
foreman 



Fuel 

and 

lubrication 



FIGURE 1.— Company E organization, beginning of 1982. 



Chief 
engineer 



Production 
manager 



General 
manager 



Maintenance 
manager 



Office 
manager 



Safety and loss 
control foreman 



Underground 
engineering 



Surface 
engineering 



Survey 
crew 



Underground 
superintendent 



Surface 
superintendent 



Preparation 

plant 

foreman 



Outside 
foreman 



Underground 
maintenance 



Surface 

maintenance 

superintendent 



Administration — 



Purchasing — 



Office 
services 



FIGURE 2.— Company E organization, end of 1982. 



Sampling 



— Training 



Security 



11 



Engineering 
and surveying 



Underground mine (2) 

L 





Development 




\' 






Mining 


1 


' 




Roof control 




i 


r 




Underground 
hauling 








' 


' 




Feeding 

and 
breaking 




1 


' 




Conveyor 

hauling 

to surface 




1 


' 




Loading 



I Coal hauling | — 
I i 

l I 



■~i r 



r" 



LJl£ 



Scale 



Crusher 



Stockpile 



Tipple 



-Surface mine (2)- 



Pioneering 



Pioneering 



Blast hole 
drilling 



Blast hole 
drilling 



Blasting 



Blasting 



Loading 



Waste 
hauling 



Reclamation 



Dragline 
operation 



Loading 



r— * n 

I I 

-| Coal hauling h- 

l i 

I I 



Plant coal 
storage 



i 

.jr_ 



r— *~ i 

i i 

—\ Coal hauling | 

' I 

L "-T ' 



1 Coal hauling | 

i i 

I i 



'1 
I 



Reclamation 
* 



Preparation 
plant 



Waste 
hauling 



Stockpile 



KEY 

] Company operations 

1 Contractor operations 



Product shipping 
(railroad) 



FIGURE 3.— Production operations of company E. 



12 



MINING COMPANY W 

Located in central Nevada, approximately 210 miles 
southeast of Reno and 90 miles northeast of Tonopah, NV, 
company W's product is dore (alloy of gold and silver), 
poured in bars of 500 to 1,000 oz each. The operation was 
originally planned to yield approximately 18,000 oz Au and 
59,000 oz Ag annually. The ore lies at an elevation of 9,000 
ft under 200 to 300 ft of over burden. It assays at only about 
0.06 oz/mt Au; thus, the recovery system uses a low-cost, 
heap-leaching method. 

Ore is mined by power shovels and trucked to a crusher 
at the mine site. There it is reduced to particles of about 0.5 
in diam and trucked to a processing area. Crushed ore is 
piled uniformly on thick plastic sheeting. A dilute cyanide 
solution is sprinkled on the ore to leach out gold and silver. 
(Later, spent ore is covered in place with topsoil and seeded 
with native grasses.) A network of pipe under the ore drains 
the gold- and-silver-bearing fluid by gravity into a storage 
pond. From the pond the fluid flows to tanks containing ac- 
tivated charcoal. The charcoal attracts gold and silver par- 
ticles and removes them from solution. The metals are then 
stripped from the charcoal by a chemical process. (The char- 
coal is cleaned and recycled in a closed system.) The metals- 
bearing solution is fed into an electrolytic cell, where gold 
and silver adhere to a steel wool electrode. After removal of 
gold and silver, the solution is returned to the circuit. The 
gold- and-silver-bearing steel wool is melted, and the im- 
purities are removed. The remaining precious metals are 
poured into bars and sold to dealers or Government agen- 
cies. 

The principal mining machines in use in 1982 are listed 
below. 

1 Chicago Pneumatic T650SS drill 

1 Gardner-Denver Air Trac drill 

2 Caterpillar 245 hydraulic shovels 
2 Caterpillar 992B loaders 

4 Wabco 50 haul trucks 

2 Wabco 50B haul trucks 

1 Caterpillar D9H tractor-dozer 

1 Caterpillar D8H tractor-dozer 

1 Caterpillar 16G grader 

1 Wabco 555 grader 

Six model 353 Peterbilt tractor and end-dump trailer 
units haul crushed ore approximately 9 miles from the 
crusher at the mine to the leach pads near the mill. A Cater- 
pillar D6C dozer is used to construct the leach heaps. Two 
Fiat-Allis 945 B loaders feed the crushing plant and load 
crushed ore into the ore trailers. (A contractor supplements 
the mine's crushed ore hauling capability with five Ken- 
worth tractor and bottom-dump trailer units.) 

Although production began in May 1981, the operation 
was still considered to be in the development phase, and 
thus 1982 was the first full year of operation. In 1982, this 
single mine of company W moved approximately 2.203 
million mt of overburden and other waste and 0.743 million 
mt of ore. 

The organization of company W at the beginning of 
1982 is shown in figure 4. During 1981, the average number 
of employees was 63; yearend strength was 101. In 1982, 
the average was 1 13 and the total varied from 102 to more 
than 120. There is no union. Organizing efforts in 1981 
resulted in a National Labor Relations Board election, but 
the union was rejected by a margin of more than 2 to 1. 





Resident 
manager 












J 




Engineering 

and 
surveying 




























Administrative 
superintendent 




Mine 
superintendent 




Maintenance 
superintendent 








































Office 
manager 






Shift 
foreman 




Shift 
foreman 














Night 
watchman 






Shift 
foreman 




Shift 
foreman 








Assay 

laboratory 

foreman 




















Shift 
foreman 


ADR plant 
foreman 










Chief 
electrician 






Crusher 
foreman 
















Purchasing 

and 
warehousing 







FIGURE 4.— Company W organization, beginning of 1982. 
(ADR— adsorption, desorption and refining.) 

Nearly 65 pet of the company W's employees are in the 
Mine and Maintenance Departments. (In mid-1982, follow- 
ing the resignation of the maintenance superintendent, the 
Maintenance Department became a responsibility of the 
Mine Department. The company's production operations are 
shown in figure 5. 



THE PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS 

The nature of the agreements with the managers who 
allowed their mines to be evaluation sites has a bearing on 
the validity of the data obtained. For that reason, the follow- 
ing brief explanations of the agreements and how they were 
reached are included here. The agreement conditions, as 
listed at the end of this section, also constitute a description 
of the model program implementation procedure (which is 
discussed in detail in the next section.) 

The research team had some knowledge of company E 
from two earlier research projects in which company E's 
parent company had a role. The safety and training 
manager of the parent company is an unusually far-sighted 
safety official who gives a lot of attention to new ideas, 
methods, and equipment intended to improve productivity 
and safety. When he heard about the model health and safe- 
ty program research, he asked for additional information. 
He then expressed his interest in it and invited the research 
team to make a presentation on the subject to the top 



13 



Mine 
engineering 
and surveying 



Blast hole 
drilling 



Topsoil 
loading 



Topsoil 
hauling 



Topsoil 

dump 

maintenance 



Blasting 

I3Z 



Reclamation 
1 



Loading 



_^ Waste 
hauling 



Dump 
maintenance 



Ore 
hauling 



I 



KEY 
I Mine department function 



Crusher 
loading 



I Maintenance department function 



Crushing 



i Assay I 
J laboratory j 
i I 



Ore 
loading 



Product 
shipping 



Ore 
hauling 



I Recovery | 



Leach pad 
maintenance 



-»j plant j- 
I operations I 

i 1 

I I 

>i Leaching l_ 

I ' 



1 
ter n 

J 



Water reuse 



i i p 

FIGURE 5.— Production operations of company W. 



manager of company E. That presentation was made early 
in 1981, before the model program was defined. The 
Bureau's objectives were reviewed, and work progress up to 
that time was discussed. The top manager (the general 
manager) spoke favorably about the research objectives and 
agreed to participate in the study. Work at company E 
began on November 9, 1982, with a safety and health audit 
of company E's four mines and a job performance sampling. 
Company W was known to the research team through 
some work done for its parent company in February 1981. 
At that time, company W was just completing construction 
of its facilities, procuring its equipment, and hiring its initial 
production work force. Its one mine was in the development 
phase. In August 1981, the researchers approached the 
manager of safety of company W's parent company. He was 
informed of the model program and requested to consider 
company W as an evaluation site. He expressed much in- 
terest and arranged for the researchers to meet with the 
mine manager and his three subordinate managers, the ad- 
ministrative superintendent, the mine superintendent, and 
the maintenance superintendent. (Company W had no safe- 
ty official and has no plans to have one in the near future.) 



These managers expressed willingness to participate in the 
study, and by December a written model program tailored 
to company W's circumstances and needs had been 
developed. 

The agreements with companies E and W had the same 
basic conditions: 

1. The top company manager (at the mine or mines) 
stated that he fully understood the fundamental conditions 
on which the model program was based. He accepted the 
program as conceptually sound and agreed to put the pro- 
gram into effect in his company. 

2. The researchers agreed to complete an initial health 
and safety audit of the company's operations and, from the 
information obtained, to define a model program tailored to 
the company's circumstances and needs. It was agreed that 
the model program would contain specific recommendations 
for management action. 

3. The top company manager agreed to consider each 
recommendation carefully and advise the researchers of his 
decision regarding acceptance. If the decision was to not ac- 
cept a recommendation, he would inform the researchers of 
the reason so they could record the information for use in 
the final evaluation of the program. 

4. The researchers agreed to assist the manager in im- 
plementing the model program by: (a) training subordinate 
managers, supervisors, and foremen in loss-control fun- 
damentals using an 8-h course created specifically to 
prepare supervisory people for implementation of model 
program concepts; (b) providing 8 h of training to super- 
visors and workers selected by the top manager in the use of 
an accident investigation methodology recently developed 
by the Bureau; (c) furnishing available materials for training 
mobile equipment operators and assisting in course develop- 
ment, to improve the company's task training; (d) providing 
health and safety technical literature and other information 
related to the company's loss-control problems and fur- 
nishing advisory service and administrative assistance as 
desired by the manager, within the scope of the model pro- 
gram; (e) visiting the company's operations once a month for 
a calendar year, or longer, to assist in program implementa- 
tion and obtain evaluation data (and the manager agreed to 
permit the researchers unrestricted access to all elements of 
the operation for observation and to all available informa- 
tion related to occupational injuries, illnesses, accidents, 
near misses, and incidents of any other kind that produce 
loss, that is, unplanned cost; (f) providing the company 
management periodically with an oral report on observa- 
tions made, additional management actions recommended, 
and countermeasure options suggested for consideration, 
and; (g) at the end of the evaluation period, presenting an 
oral report covering all of the model program research at 
the company's operations. 



IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODEL PROGRAM 



This section describes how the model program im- 
plementation activities were accomplished at the two 
cooperating mines. The implementation procedure, which 



had been worked out during the definition of the model pro- 
gram, was designed to be the same at company E and com- 
pany W. It had several definite, sequential steps. These 



14 



were outlined in the previous section ("The Participation 
Agreements") and are further discussed in the paragraphs 
below. 

Step 1 

The top manager has accepted the concepts on which 
the model program is based. The first step is to prepare for 
the top manager the information that may be needed to im- 
plement the program at his or her operation. This will be 
done in two ways. First, there will be a safety and health 
audit of the operation. This audit will not necessarily be 
comprehensive in every area but it will be sufficiently com- 
plete to provide the manager with recommended actions of 
significance in relation to each of the five previously de- 
scribed fundamental conditions. Pictures to illustrate the 
discussion of each recommendation should be used 
whenever possible. The audit report format will be the 
model health and safety program, tailored to address the 
specific needs of each operation. Second, there will be an ini- 
tial job performance sampling at the operation. A sample of 
60 to 70 jobs, chosen through a random selection process, 
without replacement, will be observed for periods of 10 to 20 
min each (depending on the nature of the job). Deficiencies 
in three categories will be recorded in order to calculate the 
proportion of the sample in which each category of deficien- 
cies exists. The sample proportions will be used as the 
estimators for the corresponding proportions of all jobs 
done by the work force. 

The first proportion :P A ) will deal with deficiencies the 
worker could correct without assistance from his employer 
or from fellow employees. Some examples of these "type A" 
deficiencies are failure to wear safety shoes, safety hat, or 
safety glasses or goggles (as required by the specific work); 
failure to maintain good housekeeping in work area; and 
loss or damage to property through deliberate actions or 
carelessness. 

The second proportion (P B ) will deal with deficiencies 
that cannot be corrected by the worker alone. Some ex- 
amples of the "type B" deficiencies are incorrectly installed 
seat safety belt, inappropriate tools provided for assigned 
tasks, and reported machine defects not corrected. 

The third proportion (P c ) will deal with environmental, 
procedural, mining plan, and other general deficiencies 
which affect several jobs and require management policy ac- 
tion for correction. Examples of the "type C" deficiency are 
failure to maintain prescribed airflow at the face, poor queu- 
ing procedures at a loading point, and failure to maintain 
necessary area lighting at dump points or congested areas. 

From the three sample proportions, a fourth propor- 
tion, P T , will be calculated. P T is the proportion of jobs in the 
sample in which at least one of the three types of deficiences 
could be observed. A mathematical definition of the four 
proportions is 



Pa = 



Pb = 
Pc- 

P T = 



n 

n b 
n 

n 

"(a »r b or c) 

n 



where n = sample size 

and n x = number of jobs with type x deficiency, where 
x = a, b, or c (corresponding to A, B, and C). 



Step 2 

The next step is to give the tailored-program report and 
the job performance sampling results to the top manager 
and discuss them with him or her. The top manager will be 
asked to state his or her decision about each recommenda- 
tion and, for those accepted, to indicate a priority in terms 
of time to complete the action. The decisions and times to 
complete each action will be recorded. The top manager will 
be asked to consider the tailored program as (1) a plan for 
implementation, to which additions will be made from time 
to time, and (2) a record of recommendations and decisions 
made, which the research team will review periodically for 
program evaluation purposes. 

The manager will be asked to explain his or her reasons 
for any decision not to accept a recommendation so that this 
information can be recorded for program evaluation pur- 
poses. A point value will be assigned to each accepted 
recommendation (100, 50, or 25). Based on observations of 
the operation, the research team will periodically assign 
points indicating the degree to which each recommended 
change has been made. The top manager will not be in- 
formed of the "point system" unless he or she asks specifical- 
ly how the evaluation is to be done. In that case, he or she 
will be given an accurate explanation, but the points assign- 
ed to each recommended aetion will not be revealed unless 
the manager insists. It is very important for the manager to 
understand that the evaluation methods employed are to 
evaluate the program, not the top manager. (Neither of the 
top managers of the two cooperating companies, nor any of 
the subordinate managers, asked about the evaluation 
details; no mention was made of the evaluation methods or 
results until the final oral report.) 

Step 3 

The research team will provide the training and other 
assistance desired by the top manager, as reflected by his or 
her decisions about the tailored program, or as specifically 
requested. However, it is very important that all assistance 
provided be in terms of showing people how to do things, not 
doing things for them. 

There are certain elements of the researchers' im- 
plementing assistance that are of special significance. 
Perhaps the most important of these is the management 
training. It is through this training that the concepts on 
which the model program is based will be explained to the 
people who must understand them if the program is to be 
acceptable and effective. 

The management training was delivered in four 2-h ses- 
sions and addressed the 15 topics listed below. 

1. Types of losses in mining. Why some of them are not 
"counted" and do not receive management attention. 

2. The functions and responsibilities of management. 
How the functions of planning, organizing, staffing, direc- 
tion, control, innovation, and representation relate to health 
and safety management. 

3. Workmen's compensation and disability costs. How 
they can be controlled. The "experience modifier" used for 
rate setting. Self-insurer's cost control. 

4. Employee motivation through creating a desirable 
work situation. Maslow's (18) hierarchy of needs. Positive 
supervisory action. 

5. Heinrich's (19) "accident pyramid" and how it relates 
to today's mining industry. The need to examine noninjury 



15 



accidents and near misses to determine "preaccident" cor- 
rective actions. The near miss as a "harbinger of things to 
come." 

6. Definition of "accident" as any event that produces 
unplanned cost or loss. Procedures for reporting all ac- 
cidents and analyses of related events in a fact-finding, 
rather than fault-finding mode. Accepting the concept that 
every accident represents some failure in management of 
the production system. 

7. The futility -and risk -of reliance on common sense. 
The need to define in writing all of management's expecta- 
tion for each job, and to train and supervise accordingly. 

8. Who are the "loss producers"? How are they iden- 
tified? What should be done about them? Typically, about 
one-third of the accidents involve only about 5 pet of the 
workers. Aside from their accident experience, what other 
factors characterize the 5 pet? 

9. The myth that the majority of accidental injuries 
result from "unsafe acts." The need to reduce or remove 
hazards in the workplace. Some practical, inexpensive 
hazard reduction examples. 

10. The cost of accidents in company sales terms. How 
much more product does your company have to sell to pay 
for a "$500 accident," if the planned profit on operations is 
to be maintained? Examples to show, for example, "how 
many extra ore (coal) trucks have to come down the moun- 
tain." 

11. Evaluating potential countermeasures on the basis 
of their return on investment (ROI). The logic of investing 
so long as the ROI exceeds the cost of capital. 
Countermeasures against accidents, injuries, and inefficient 
job performance due to poor job design. 

12. Analyzing a training problem, using the Mager 
method of identifying the actual need. How to train for the 
best results at lower cost. A second look at "task {raining." 

13. Absenteeism and its effects. What the supervisor 
can do to reduce absenteeism. "Short crew" operating pro- 
cedures to improve safety and health. 

14. The importance of the workers' perception of 
management's interest in their safety and health, and in loss 
control generally. How management people, from super- 
visors to the top manager, must demonstrate their interest, 
concern, and commitment. 

15. Some examples of accidents and near misses, each 
having many contributing factors. What are the production 
system management failures? What are the 
countermeasures? Many countermeasures do not require 
additional investment. 

Because topics 10 and 11 may not be clear from infor- 
mation in earlier sections of this report, the following brief 
discussion explains them further. Assume that for a certain 
workplace task there exists a relatively high probability, P^ 
of an accident, as evident from the history of accidents over 
a period of a couple of years. No countermeasure actions 
have been taken except to explain the accidents to the 
workers and to tell them to "exercise care." Then several 
changes are made: Better procedures for doing the task are 
developed, thorough training is given, and closer supervi- 
sion is provided. 

Typically, each of the first few countermeasure actions 
(assuming that they are properly planned and implemented) 
will produce a substantial reduction in the probability of an 
accident -and at relatively low cost. The return on the 
countermeasure investment will be readily apparent. The 
accident probability is reduced to P 2 . However, as other 
countermeasures are applied, the reduction in accident 



probability may be less and the cost of each countermeasure 
may be relatively greater (unless there is a substantial 
technological change in the process design and the character 
of the task in question is changed very substantially). The 
actual value of additional countermeasures may not be evi- 
dent unless a careful analysis is done. Without such 
analysis, an organization may invest in countermeasures 
that produce very little accident probability reduction 
benefit. In other words, P 2 should have become an accepted 
level of risk. Conversely, without analysis, the organization 
might not invest in countermeasures that would produce a 
return significantly greater than the cost. Analyses of 
countermeasure actions should not consider one hazard 
alone, but simultaneously all of those extant which are "com- 
peting" for countermeasure investment. All organizations 
have some degree of capital rationing. The logic of "oppor- 
tunity cost" should be applied in countermeasure action 
analyses. That is, the choice of a given countermeasure in- 
vestment must include consideration of other foregone 
countermeasure investment opportunities that would have 
yielded a return greater than the cost of capital. 

A very simple illustration of one of the several uses of 
the expectation model as a tool for analysis follows. Table 1, 
a tabulation of National Safety Council data (20), shows the 
amount of sales in various industries necessary to produce 
$500 of pretax profit. For the purpose of illustration, 
assume that a given mine's required sales are somewhere 
between the amounts shown for "metal mining," $3,335, and 
"Stone, clay products," $10,870, perhaps $5,000, the amount 
for "Quarrying mining." Thus, to pay for $45 in unplanned 
cost (accidental loss), $450 in additional sales will be needed 
to maintain the planned profit from operations. What may 
seem to be small risks may actually be quite large in overall 
profitability terms. To continue the illustration, assume the 
following: 

1. It is estimated that, in a year of operation, there is 1 
chance in 20 that a particular accident will occur, based on 
accident history over several years. 

2. If the accident should occur one or more times, the 
minimum cost (or loss) will be about $5,000. 

3. It is estimated that an expenditure of $200 for a 
given countermeasure would reduce the probability of oc- 
currence of the accident in a year from 1 chance in 20 to 1 in 
1,000. Actually, supervisors estimate that the 
countermeasure will reduce the probability to zero, but 
0.001 is taken to be the lowest probability allowed in the 
analysis. 

A simplified expected value calculation is shown in table 
2. Two alternative actions are considered. Action Ai is to 
take no countermeasure action. The expectation, E(A,), is 
that this course of action, give the 0.05 probability of an ac- 
cident, will cost $250 each year. Action A 2 is to install a 
countermeasure for $200, and thereby greatly reduce the 
probability that the accident will occur (to 0.001). If that 
course of action is taken, the expectation, E(A 2 ), is that ac- 
tion A 2 will cost $250 per year, or $45 less than action A,. 
Again, the $45 represents $450 in sales. 

Suppose that, to go further with the illustration, MSHA 
issues a citation and imposes an assessment of $ 1 00 because 
there is no corrective action for a hazard as required by a 30 
CFR standard. For one year at least (the penalty could be 
increased if the corrective action is not taken), the estimated 
net cost increases to $5,100 if there is an accident and $100 
if there isn't. (See table 2.) The expectation for Ai becomes 
$350, and the difference between E(Ai) and E(A 2 ) becomes 



16 



TABLE 1.— Sales needed to offset accident cost 1 

(Sales necessary to produce $500 profit, by industrial group) 

Sales 

Industry needed 

Aerospace $16,665 

Air transport 16,655 

Amusements 7,81 5 

Autos, trucks 11 ,365 

Automotive parts 11 ,905 

Baking 17,855 

Brewing 10,870 

Building, heating, plumbing equipment 12,195 

Cement 9,260 

Chemical products 7,575 

Clothing, apparel 13,515 

Common carrier trucking 13,890 

Construction 11,630 

Dairy products 16,130 

Department, specialty stores 16,130 

Distilling 9,805 

Drugs, medicines 5,050 

Electrical equipment, electronics 10,205 

Electric power, gas 5,050 

Farm, construction-materials handling equipment 8,195 

Food chains 50,000 

Food products 12,195 

Furniture, fixtures 13,515 

Glass products 7,935 

Hardware, tools 9,615 

Household appliances 10,640 

Instruments, photo goods 6,755 

Iron, steel 14,285 

Lumber, wood products 8,185 

Machinery 9,435 

Mail order business 10,870 

Meat packing 33,335 

Metal mining 3,335 

Metal products 13,160 

Nonferrous metals 10,635 

Office equipment, computers 5,495 

Paint, allied products 20,000 

Paper, allied products 8,335 

Petroleum products, refining 9,615 

Printing, publishing 8,065 

Quarrying, mining 5,000 

Railroads 33,335 

Restaurants, hotels 11,365 

Rubber, allied products 20,835 

Shoes, leather goods 12,820 

Soap, cosmetics 7,245 

Soft drinks 7,145 

Stone, clay products 10,870 

Sugar 17,855 

Telephone, telegraph 4,715 

Textile products 17,855 

Tobacco products 9,615 

Variety store chains 16,665 

Wholesale houses 20,000 



'Dollar value of goods and services required to produce $500 pretax 
profit. Profit margins are the most recent published by Citibank of New 
York for leading corporations reporting sales or gross income figures. 

Source: National Safety Council. 



TABLE 2.— Simplified expected value calculation 



Eventuality Probability of Annual net cost 

occurrence Normal With penalty 

Action A, (no corrective 
action): 

Accidents occur 0.05 $5,000 $5,100 

No accidents occur .95 100 

E(A,)' NAp 250 350 

Action A, (corrective action): 

Accidents occur .001 5,200 NAp 

No accidents occur .999 200 NAp 

E(A,)' NAp 205 NAp 

NAp Not applicable. 

'Expectation, E(A) = (Probability ol occurrence) (annual net cost) tor situation 
where accidents occur plus (probability ot occurrence) (annual net cost) tor situa- 
tion where no accidents occur. 



$145, or $1,450 in sales. Generally, the cost of an MSHA 
assessment is but a fraction of the cost of an accident. This 
is often true even if the internal costs of discussing, 
disputing, and protesting an assessment are added, 
although these kinds of internal costs may subtantially in- 
crease E(Ai). 

The research team also provided training in accident in- 
vestigation methods. Further information about this train- 
ing can be found in the final report for a prior Bureau con- 
tract (17). 

MINING COMPANY E 

Work to implement the model program at Company E 
began in November 1981 with (1) a health and safety audit 
that would later be the basis for the tailored program and (2) 
the initial job performance sampling. The job performance 
sampling produced the following results: 

P A = 0.676. The most frequent deficiency was failure to 
wear prescribed personal protection equip- 
ment, especially safety hats. Several super- 
visors were among those who did not wear 
safety hats. Many haul trucks had 
unauthorized reading material and other 
"extraneous materials" in the cab, in viola- 
tion of 30 CFR 77.1607(d). 

P B = 0.284. The most frequently deficiency was the 
absence of or incorrect installation of seat 
safety belts in mobile machines. 

P c = 0.257. The most frequent deficiency was very poor 
area housekeeping. There were inadequate 
berms along some haul roads. 

P T = 0.743. Of the jobs sampled, 74.3 pet were being 
performed with one or more of the three 
types of deficiency. 

In March, the top manager notified the research team 
that all the recommendations contained in the tailored 
model had been accepted and that implementation of the 
program was to be coordinated by the company's safety of- 
ficer. 

In April, the top manager was discharged for reasons that 
had nothing directly to do with the model program. The new 
top manager was a mining engineer with several years of 
experience as the mine manager at a large underground 
coal mine in a nearby State. The pace of the model program 
implementation increased immediately following his ar- 
rival -especially the training and workplace hazard removal 
activity. He set an excellent example for other supervisors 
and workers. However, progress in a few areas was slow, 
particularly in the use of personal protection equipment. 
The reason had to do primarily with the top manager's 
desire to avoid actions that might cause "labor trouble" at 
company E. The manager said he agreed with the model 
program recommendations and intended to put them into 
effect, but he preferred to do so with the full ap- 
proval - perhaps even at the initiative - of the union local of- 
ficials and some of the senior supervisors who were 
forecasting "trouble" if changes were made too rapidly. This 
process would "take some time," he said. He was correct. 
Some of the personal protection equipment rules would not 
have become effective as soon as they did had the parent 
company (new owner) not ordered them at all of its proper- 
ties. To demonstrate the parent company's commitment 



17 



persuasively, two vice-president-level officials visited Com- 
pany E several times and during each visit made clear to 
managers and workers that safety and health were matters 
of great concern and high priority. By the time this hap- 
pened, the new top manager of Company E had, through 
discussion, example, and considerate suggestion, developed 
an atmosphere of acceptance and cooperation. 

The implementation assistance provided by the research 
team included training nearly every month through January 
1983. The courses for managers were given to groups of 
three to eight, usually for 4 h during one month and 4 h dur- 
ing the next. Thirty-one managers completed the "Introduc- 
tion to Loss Control Management" course, and 32 com- 
pleted the "Accident Investigation Methods" course. Other 
implementation assistance by the researchers included - 

Assisting the safety official (designated "Safety and 
Loss Control Foreman" in April 1982) in setting up an im- 
proved accident reporting and records system. 

Acquiring sets of climbing lines (webbing with 
carabiners on each end) for use by persons who must climb 
drill masts and demonstrating the use of the equipment to 
the safety and loss control foreman, drill foreman, surface 
superintendent, and drill workers. 

Assisting the safety and loss control foreman and 
maintenance superintendent in acquiring expanded metal 
ladder treads, and constructing from them and used con- 
veyor belting lower suspended steps (two or three steps) for 
haul truck ladders and ladders of other large surface 
machines; and setting up evaluation of the step units with 
driver participation. 

Assisting the safety and loss control foreman to plan, 
prepare, and narrate two audio-visual hazard training pro- 
grams, one for surface mine visitors and new employees and 
one for underground mine visitors and new employees. 

Coaching selected shift foremen and the safety and loss 
control foreman through approximately 20 accident and 
near miss investigations, using the method taught in the ac- 
cident investigation course. 

Instructing the safety and loss control foreman and 
three other people in operation of the Terex 33-1 1C (85-mt) 
haul truck, using training materials and simulator equip- 
ment developed under a prior Bureau contract (21); and 
coaching these people in the use of the materials and the 
simulator to train others. 

Assisting underground mine superintendents in plan- 
ning and implementing "absentee controls." 

Providing for trial by roof bolter machine operators a 
new type of safety glasses which provides better eye protec- 
tion with less interference with, or distortion of, vision. 

Coaching the safety and loss control foreman and two 
other persons in use of the job performance sampling 
method used for evaluation (following a company decision to 
use the method in the regular monthly mine inspections). 

Providing the safety and loss control foreman with a 
large number (30 or more) of technical references to answer 
questions he asked and provide authoritative sources of in- 
formation for training materials he prepared. 

Discussing with superintendents; shift, section, and job 
foremen; the wash plant foreman; the tipple foreman; and 
the "deadwork" foremen problems in training, supervision, 
and hazard removal, and other loss-control areas they iden- 
tified and asked to discuss. 

Assisting, as requested, in completing actions necessary 
to implement the recommendations in the tailored program. 

Appendix A of this report contains some excerpts from 
the tailored program document for mining company E, 



which was based on the health and safety audit of November 
1981. The excerpts will enable the reader to see the form 
and content of typical recommendations. The management 
decision and priority (which in the case of company E, was 
usually set by the safety and loss control foreman) are given. 
The points assigned by the research team are also listed, 
although, as mentioned earlier, these were not known to 
management. 



MINING COMPANY W 

The health and safety audit for company W, the basis 
for the tailored program, was performed in October 1981. 
The initial job performance sampling was also done at that 
time. Sixty-six jobs were included in the sample. The results 
were as follows: 

P A = 0.818. The most frequent deficiences were failures 
to wear safety hats, safety shoes, and other 
prescribed personal protection equipment; 
and poor housekeeping in mobile machine 
cabs. 

P B = 0.409. The most frequent deficiencies were lack of 
seat safety belts in mobile machines, in- 
operative backup alarms, and inadequate 
hearing protection in high-noise areas 
(crushing plant). 

P c = 0.591. The most frequent deficiencies were poor 
area housekeeping and assignment of inap- 
propriate machines to some tasks. 

P T = 0.864. Of the jobs sampled, 86.4 pet were affected 
by one or more of the three types of job per- 
formance deficiences. 

The safety and health audit, the "tailored program," and the 
job sampling results were discussed with the top manager 
(resident manager) in December. He accepted the majority 
of the recommendations for implementation and requested 
that the courses in loss control management and accident in- 
vestigation methods begin immediately. 

The manager preferred that each course be limited to 2 
h per month. Thus, 4 months passed before the manage- 
ment course was completed by the resident manager and 
the other five managers (superintendents and mine shift 
foremen). The accident investigation course was completed 
by nine people: the resident manager, the three 
superintendents, and five workers (elected from the five 
major work groups to serve as members of a labor- 
management committee). 

The pace of the initial implementation work was aided 
by two fortuitous events not anticipated by the research 
team. These events were fortuitous in that they noticeably 
increased management's interest in, and concern about, the 
consequences of safety and health deficiencies. The first of 
the events was a safety inspection by company W's parent 
company safety staff. It reported 70 deficiencies, both large 
and small. The report came "through channels," with direc- 
tives for action, many of which were the same ones recom- 
mended in the researchers' tailored model. The second event 
was that an MSHA mine inspector gave advisory com- 
pliance notices to management concerning many of the defi- 
ciencies that were also in the parent company's report and 
the model program recommendations, and some which were 
not. His work was especially helpful in calling attention to 
some air contamination problems in the mill. He was very 



18 



helpful, and also very firm, in his recommendations to com- 
pany management. 

There was no safety position (this is, no safety official) 
at company W and no intention to create one. Thus, unlike 
company E, where much of the research team's implementa- 
tion assistance came from the safety official, implementa- 
tion at company W was directed primarily by the three 
superintendents. (See figure 4). In addition to conditions ad- 
dressed in the specific recommendations of the tailored pro- 
gram (excerpts from which are given in appendix B), there 
were several unsafe conditions in the operations for which 
each superintendent was responsible. Some of these were 
identified in the MSHA and parent company reports. Some 
were not. The research team believed it would be ap- 
propriate to address all unsafe conditions aggressively as 
part of management training. This belief was strengthened 
by the defensive reactions of two of the three supervisors 
during some "walkarounds" to point out the hazards. Some 
of the common reaction were as follows: 

"No one has ever been hurt." 

"If a worker gets hurt, it'll be caused by human error." 

"It hasn't been cited by MSHA." 

The general approach used to "coach" the managers 
through eliminating or reducing unsafe conditions is in- 
dicated in figure 6. The two actions shown closest to the box 
labeled "Unsafe conditions" in figure 6 could be taken im- 
mediately. Usually the needed personal protection equip- 
ment was on the property or could be obtained within a day 
to two. Closer supervision usually amounted to instructing 
foremen about the hazard and precautions that could be 
taken, in addition to requiring use of personal protection 



equipment. Prohibiting a worker from doing a task alone 
was a frequent countermeasure. Establishing sound work 
procedures is best accomplished through participation of 
workers as well as supervisors, and reference to industrial 
standards and practice documents. As indicated in figure 6, 
employees must be trained in the new procedures. 
Establishing procedures takes time, typically 2 to 4 weeks. 
Removing unsafe conditions is the most effective way to 
reduce risk, but may require the most time to complete and 
some additional investment. Suggestions from workers who 
perform the task are often of great value in defining alter- 
natives. Removing the unsafe condition must be the 
management goal; however attaining that goal is not always 
possible. On the other hand, it is often possible to ac- 
complish this goal with surprising ease, once management 
reluctance to take action has been overcome. This is the 
principal lesson of the special training for the 
superintendents. 

A second area that required special training emphasis at 
company W was compliance with 30 CFR 50. It is not 30 
CFR 50 recording and reporting per se that is important, 
but the entire subject of accurate accident, injury, and near- 
miss records. It was found at the beginning of the model 
program that not one of the superintendents or foremen 
understood the 30 CFR 50 requirements accurately. As at 
the majority of the mines visited during the background 
research, the decision about what to report on the MSHA 
form 7000-1 (mine accident, injury, and illness report) was 
left to a clerical person who did not understand the 30 CFR 
50 requirements either. Furthermore, the clerk could report 
to MSHA only what was recorded by the supervisors, that is 
to say, very little. The research team's first training attempt 
produced very unimpressive results. When tested, the 



Personal 

protection for 

worker 



?t. 



conditions 




Remove by process 
or task redesign 



Sound work procedures 
and thorough training 
on those procedures 



Close, careful 
supervision 






FIGURE 6.— Approach used to reduce unsafe conditions. 



19 



supervisor's understanding of 30 CFR 50 was shown to be 
very little better after the training than before. It was clear 
that the training method needed improvement. The problem 
of getting people to understand the rules was discussed one 
day with some MSHA mine inspectors. One of them has a 
"flow diagram" that depicted the rules for investigating and 
reporting injuries (but not accidents). The research team 
took his idea and expanded it to create a guide. The guide 
and about 30 "example cases" were used in subsequent 
training with good results at company W. (Similar results 
were produced with the same training later at company E). 
Other implementation assistance activities of the 
research team at company W included - 

Obtaining technical information from MSHA and instru- 
ment manufacturers about methods of sampling the plant 
air for mercury vapor content. 

Assisting the maintenance superintendent in evaluate- 
ing several types of available jib and gantry cranes for use in 
a maintenance shop bay that had no bridge crane installed. 
(The shop was using a front-end loader or a forklift truck to 
lift engines and transmissions out of machines in a manner 
that was both hazardous and expensive.) 

Acquiring for the mine superintendent a copy of a 
Power Shovel and Crane Association manual titled 
"Hydraulic Excavators and Telescoping Boom Cranes" and 
assisting him in instructing workers who would become 
authorized operators of two truck-mounted cranes. 

Making copies of 29 CFR 1910.184, which deals with 
slings on truck-mounted cranes for the maintenance 
superintendent; giving instruction and conducting 
demonstrations for selected mechanics on the correct ways 
to rig loads for crane lifts, based on the 29 CFR 1910 stand- 
ards. 



Preparing, at the request of the mine superintendent, a 
reference book containing the manufacturers' operating 
manuals for every type of mobile machine used at the mine. 
(There had been no operating manuals at the mine.) 

Preparing a haul truck operator training guide for in- 
structors who trained new employees on Wabco 50 and 50B 
trucks. 

Preparing a hazard training program, using slides and 
audio tape, for visitor and employment applicants. 

Arranging for training films to be loaned to company W 
for showing at safety meetings. 

Contacting another mine (a mercury mine), at the sug- 
gestion of MSHA, to obtain for company W some user's ex- 
perience information regarding air monitoring instrumenta- 
tion. 

Providing a copy of a slide and audio tape training pro- 
gram on preshift inspection of off-highway diesel trucks 
developed under a prior Bureau contract (22). 

Preparing, for the drilling and blasting foreman, a task 
training guide for new employees assigned to drill or 
blasting crews (based on 30 CFR 55 standards; U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers general safety requirements as listed in 
section 25 of reference 23; and the "Excavation Handbook," 
by Horace K. Church (24)). 

Participating in the monthly meetings of the 
management-employee committee (at the invitation of the 
resident manager). 

Conferring with individual workers, as requested by the 
resident manager or a superintendent, to encourage their 
acceptance of new safety rules (for example about using 
safety seat belts in bulldozers, about dust masks and ear 
protection in the crushing facility, or about forced ventila- 
tion in confined areas when welding). 



FIELD EVALUATION OF THE MODEL PROGRAM 



This section discusses the field evaluation, the final 
research task in this project. Following the initial job perfor- 
mance sampling at both of the participating mining com- 
panies, the research team made some estimates about how 
the companies compared to others in the mining industry 
and the degree of improvement that could be attained 
through implementation of the model program. The 
estimates were based on trial experiences with the job per- 
formance sampling technique and some subjective observa- 
tions at 60 operations, including those visited during the 
background research phase of this project. It was judged 
that the 60 were a reasonably representative sample of the 
industry, at least for the purpose of the desired estimates. 

"Loss control management effectiveness" is used rather 
than "health and safety management effectiveness" because 
the sampling nearly always included some things usually not 
considered to be health and safety matters. Loss control 
management effectiveness is inversely proportional to the 
amount of loss risk tolerated in an operation. The samples 
taken in the 60 operations suggest that if mining operations 
were placed in an array according to degree of loss risk ac- 
ceptance and the distribution plotted, the resulting graph 
would be approximately a normal distribution with large 
variance, that is, one with a characteristic shape like that 
shown in figure 7. In figure 7 approximately 68 pet of all 
operations in the distribution are included within ± 1 stan- 
dard deviation (± la) from the mean, and 95.5 pet are within 



±2a. The various levels of risk may be defined as follows 
(from right to left in the graph in figure 7): 

"Very high loss risk": Operations judged to have an 
overall loss risk that is more than 2a above the mean. Very 
poor loss control management. Approximately 2.3 pet of all 
operations will be in this group. 

"Well above average loss risk": Operations judged to 
have an overall loss risk that is more than la above the 
mean, but less than 2a. Poor loss control management. Ap- 
proximately 13.6 pet of all operations will be in this group. 

"Above average loss risk": Operations with overall loss 
risk above the mean, but less the la above it. Below average 



Effective 

loss 

control 



Ineffective 

loss 

control 




FIGURE 7.— Distribution of loss control management effec- 
tiveness. 



20 



loss control management. Approximately 34.1 pet of all 
operations will be in this group. 

"Below average loss risk": Operations with overall loss 
risk below the mean, but less than la below it. Above 
average loss control management. Approximately 34.1 pet 
of all operations will be in this group. 

"Well below average loss risk": Operations with overall 
loss risk more than la below the mean, but less than 2a 
below it. Excellent loss control management. Approximate- 
ly 13.6 pet of all operations will be in this group. 

"Very low loss risk": Operations with overall loss risk 
more than 2a below the mean. Outstanding loss control 
management. Approximately 2.3 pet of all operations will be 
in this group. 

Figure 8 shows the estimated positions of companies E 
and W in the distribution prior to model program implemen- 
tation. The estimate was that their loss risk positions were 
better than those of approximately 20 to 25 pet of the 
mining operations. They had above average loss risk and 
below average loss control management. 

A realistic goal of 1 yr of serious implementation of the 
model program, the research team estimated, would be to 
improve loss control management so that a followup evalua- 
tion made in the same way would put the companies in the 
top 10 to 15 pet of the distribution. Their loss risk positions 
would then be "well below average," indicating excellent loss 
control management. The shaded area in figure 8 graph, to 
the left of - la, indicates the region they would occupy in 
the distribution. Another way of stating the same "goal" is 
to say that the job performance sampling results would 
show 



and 



The research team judged that a P T of 0.05 or less would 
surely place a mine in the top 10 to 15 pet of the distribution 
of loss control management effectiveness ratings. Not one 
of the 60 operations at which the job performance sampling 
technique was tried had a P T value as low as 0.05, but one of 
them came close. The P T values corresponding to the 
distribution "tail," beyond - la, were not at all clear. It may 
be that a P T value of 0.05 corresponds to - 2a, that is, the 
top 2.3 pet of operations in terms of loss control manage- 
ment effectiveness. In any case, there seemed to be no 
reason to think that a P T < 0.05 could not be achieved, pro- 
vided that the model program was implemented effectively. 
It was judged that "effective implementation" would be the 
attainment of a total score of 80 pet or more of the points 
assigned to the recommendations in the tailored program 
accepted by management. 



Effective 

loss 

control 



Ineffective 

loss 

control 



Pa 


< 


0.05, 


Pb 


< 


.05, 


Pc 


< 


.05, 


Pt 


< 


.05. 




-2<r / -lo- 


H- 


+l<r 


+2<r 


Low / 


AVERAGE 




High 


1-yr goal 








(both companies) 









FIGURE 8.— Loss control effectiveness positions of com- 
panies E and W. 



As previously stated, none of the managers knew 
anything about the evaluation method except that they were 
told the values of the four proportions from the initial 
sampling and the deficiencies that were observed. The 
research team did not want the managers to concern 
themselves with "scorekeeping," lest they get into a "contest 
frame of mind." Had that happened, the fifth criterion for 
the model (acceptability on its merit alone) probably could 
not have been evaluated. 

MINING COMPANY E 

The iesults for the five job performance samples taken 
at company E are given in table 3 and shown on the graph in 
figure 9. Note that the high initial P T (0.743) was mostly due 
to the high P A (0.676). Company E had poor employee per- 
formance with respect to personal protection equipment, 
partly because the local rules were merely restatements of 
MSHA standards and partly because little had been done to 
encourage compliance with the rules. The substantial 
change in P A between March 1982 and January 1983 was 
due primarily to improved workplace housekeeping; 
machine operators keeping cabs, windows, and mirrors 
clean and observing speed limits; welders wearing proper 
protective gear more frequently; and more underground 
miners using eye protection. 

The change would have been much greater except that 
the top manager did not believe that two new personal pro- 
tection rules could be uncompromisingly enforced during 
the period without difficult problems involving the union 
and some supervisors. Near the end of the period, directives 
from company E's parent company made the two rules man- 
datory at all of the parent company's operations. These 
rules required (1) the wearing of safety helmets ("hard 
hats") by all persons on the property except office workers 
while in their offices and (2) the wearing of seat safety belts 
by operators and authorized passengers in all mobile mining 
machines and personnel vehicles. These rather fundamental 
safety rules had been operative only to the extent that the 



TABLE 3— Job performance sampling results, company E 









Sample 

size (n) 










Proport 


on of jobs with deficiencies. 


by type' 








Month 






Pa 






Pb 




Pc 






Pt 






"a 




Factor 


% 


Factor 


"c 




Factor 


"t 




Factor 


November 1981 






74 

76 
64 
70 
52 




50 
51 
39 
35 
16 




0.676 
.671 
.609 
.500 

308 


21 
24 
20 
20 

13 


0.284 
.316 
.313 
.286 
.250 


19 

19 
14 
14 
9 




0.257 
.250 
.219 
.200 
.173 


55 
56 
44 
39 
19 




743 


March 1982 






737 


June 1982 






688 


September 1982 






557 


January 1983 






366 










■*- + 


P B = 


n 




Pc 




"c 
n 




P T = ^ 


a or b or c) 
n 















21 



0.8 



Sy 

OLL. 
-UJ 
r~ O 




O LU 



6/82 9/82 1/83 



FIGURE 9.— Proportions of jobs sampled at company E in 
which deficiency types P A , P B ,Pc. ar| d Pj were observed. 

safety and loss control foreman and other cooperating 
foremen had been able to influence workers through exam- 
ple, training, and persuasive discussion. Had the rules been 
established and enforced in say, September 1982, the 
January P A would likely have been approximately 0.190, 
rather than 0.308. This statement is made with some con- 
fidence because the research project manager had the op- 
portunity to visit company E in late March 1983 in connec- 
tion with another project, and a job performance sampling 
done at that time showed a decrease of nearly 0.120 in P A 
since January 1983. (The sampling also showed decreases of 
approximately 0.07 in P B and 0.05 in P r .) 

The small decreases in P B and P c between March 1982 
and January 1983 indicate, as noted earlier, a relatively 
slow start in correcting deficiencies of types B and C and a 
longer time to complete implementation than was originally 
estimated. The degree to which management was able to 
put into practice the recommendations in the tailored model 
may also be reflected in the relatively low rate of decrease in 
P B and P c . (These recommendations are listed and discussed 
later in this section.) The increase in P B from November 
1981 to March 1982 was very likely due primarily to 
unusually harsh weather in January and February. For 
several weeks it took all of the available maintenance 
capability do the work necessary to keep the surface 
machines moving so that surface production could be sus- 
tained. There was no time available for what was regarded 
as "nonessential" work. In other words, the management 
felt it was necessary to accept an extra short-term risk in 
order to satisfy contractual commitments and keep coal 
moving to the customers. 

The discussion in this section has been about sample pro- 
portions. P T is the proportion of the sample in which some 
job performance deficiency was observed. In the population 
of all jobs in company E, the job performance deficiency pro- 
portion is termed n T . The best estimator of n T is P T . The 
population proportion is made with certain confidence 
limits. Figure 10 shows the 95-pct confidence limits for each 
estimate of ir T , where the 7r T curve was plotted from the P T 
values shown in figure 9. (The scales of the ordinated and 
abscissa were changed to make the confidence intervals 
easier to visualize.) 




1/83 



FIGURE 10.— Job-deficiency 95-pct confidence limits for ir T 
at company E. 



Table 4 is a list of the recommendations that were in- 
cluded in the tailored model for company E. The points 
assigned to each recommendation by the research team (for 

TABLE 4.— Recommendations in tailored model 
for company E 

Assigned Attained 

Recommendations points' points 

Train and stress loss control management . . . 100 75 

Integrate safety and production in each job 

definition 100 25 

Identify job for full-time safety person, if 

desired 100 95 

Improve visitor control and training 100 90 

Stop practice of loading private coal in pit ... . 100 100 

Better housekeeping: 

Plant 50 40 

Surface shops 50 10 

Underground shops 50 40 

Surface mine 50 25 

Proper parking of private vehicles 50 30 

Get extraneous materials out of machine 

cabs 50 40 

Correct safety guide re: ROPS and seat belts .50 15 

Stop welding, drilling, or cutting ROPS 50 30 

Institute end-of-shift inspection require- 
ments 50 40 

Keep windows and mirrors clean 50 30 

Improve hopper closing on railroad cars 50 

Check "panic bar" operation daily (on roof 
bolters, shuttle cars, and continuous 

miners) 100 90 

Make certain adequate fire extinguishers 

are provided and serviced 100 90 

Secure all blasting material at end of shift .. . 100 85 

Top managers to- 
Set example 100 75 

Budget safety time 100 20 

Review investigations 100 50 

Observe and give reinforcement 100 50 

Require near-miss investigation and 

discussions 100 50 

Improve ladders on mobile machines 100 10 

Correctly install and maintain seat safety 

belts 100 90 

Require all workers and supervisors to wear 

safety hats, except in offices 100 70 

Establish and enforce a clear, safe personal 
radio policy for mobile machine 

operators 50 25 

Establish and enforce road-width and berm- 

dimension policy 100 50 

Remove hazards noted at tipple 100 75 

Create requirement for noninjury accident 

reporting 100 80 

Create safety committee that includes 

workers 100 60 

Create emergency responsibility plan for 

weekends and holidays 100 75 

Provide guard at surface mine with land 
line or radio communication with main 

gate 50 

Improve method of providing and servicing 

personal safety equipment 50 

Improve recordkeeping and reporting 100 80 

Improve task training 100 80 

'Points assigned by research team as basis for evaluations. 



22 



evaluation purposes) and the points attained during the im- 
plementation and evaluation periods are also shown. The 
maximum attainable score was 3,000. As noted earlier, the 
research team had judged that attainment of 80 pet of the 
points, or 2,400, would represent effective program im- 
plementation. The actual attainment by company E was 
1,890, or 63 pet of the total assigned points. 

Most of the recommendations in table 4, although stated 
in very brief form, are self-explanatory. A few require addi- 
tional explanation. 

"Correct safety guide re: ROPS and seat belts" referred 
to rules in Company E's safety rule book. The rules were: 
"Vehicles driven with doors open must have the operator 
secured with seat belts," and "Roll bars (ROPS) and 
canopies must be provided on equipment such as front-end 
loaders and bulldozers for the operator's protection in the 
event of capsize." 

The recommendation was to make clear to workers, 
through training and supervision, (1) that the seat safety 
belt must be worn in every vehicle any time it is operated, 
(2) that the use of the seat belt is essential to protect the 
operator in mobile equipment equiped with ROPS, and (3) 
that 30 CFR 77.403a requires the use of seat belts on ROPS- 
equipped mobile equipment. The recommendation also call- 
ed for incorporating the seat safety belt rules into every 
work procedure involving vehicles on mobile equipment and 
modifying the safety rule book appropriately if management 
wished to continue its publication. 

"Create safety committee that includes workers" re- 
ferred to a need to encourage cooperative effort on safety 
and health matters. The union contract had a provision for 
action by an elected safety committee in the event that 
serious safety hazards were allowed to occur in a mine. 
There was a company safety committee that consisted en- 
tirely of management people. There was more than a hint of 
hostility in the operation of the union safety committee, and 
the company committee's mode of operation seemed to do 
little to encourage the adversaries to become cooperating 
participants in the processes of hazard identification and 
removal. These are management processes, but they are 
done best when the ideas of the workers are solicited and 
considered. Some of the other recommendations are ex- 
plained by the examples in appendix A. 

Figure 11 shows the number of injuries and work- 
related illnesses at company E in each month of 1982 that 
was required to be reported to MSHA under 30 CFR 50 pro- 
visions. Accident, injury, and illness recordkeeping and 
reporting improved greatly during this period (program im- 
plementation and evaluation). However, the number of 
"reportables" per month had a small downward trend during 
the period. This is evident from the solid-line curve in figure 
11 and the decreasing slope of the cumulative curve. Still, 
the total for 1982 was unacceptably high. A check on ac- 
cidents through much of 1983 indicated that the downward 
trend continued. The first-quarter total of reportables in 
1983 was less than half the first-quarter- 1982 total. 

Figure 12 shows a more impressive loss reduction 
trend, in the number of "lost-time" days due to accidental, 
work-related injuries for each month of 1982. The solid line 
that connects the monthly data points has a definite 
downward trend, and the slope of the cumulative curve 
decreases greatly after midyear. Only about one-fourth of 
the lost days for the year occurred in the last half of the 
year. This does not mean that injuries were becoming less 
"seven 1 " in terms of physical damage, but it does mean that 
the actions of the safety and loss control foreman and the 



Q 

■z. 

< 



c/>cn 

LULU 

5uj 



< 
O 




May July Sept 



FIGURE 11.— Monthly MSHA reportable injuries and il- 
lnesses at company E, 1982. 





700 




600 


(/> 




:>. 






500 


UJ 


400 


r- 


300 


^ 




rr 




o 


200 


£ 






IOO ( 




Jan Mar May July Sept Nov Jan 

FIGURE 12. — Monthly work days missed by company E 
employees because of work-related injuries, 1982. 

general manager to control post-injury events produced 
substantial reductions in the "severity measure" defined in 
30 CFR 50. 



MINING COMPANY W 

The results for the six job performance samples taken at 
company W are given in table 5 and shown on the graph in 
figure 13. The initial P T was very high (0.864). In nearly 9 
out of every 10 jobs sampled, the employee was working 
with 1 or more of the 3 types of deficiencies. Substantial im- 
provements began immediately upon implementation, in Pg 
and P ( . as well as in P A . The rate of improvement increased 
greatly after July 1982. In July and August, the resident 
manager established several new rules about personal pro- 
tection equipment use and housekeeping practices. The en- 
forcement of these rules accounted for much of the increas- 
ed rate of improvement in P.. The small increase in P„ bet- 
ween January and April was likely due largely to very harsh 
February and March weather. The very large decrease in P ( . 
was a result of almost continuous improvements in the work 
environment at the crushing facility, the mill, and the 
maintenance shop; coupled with improvements in the haul 
road and maintenance yard in the last half of 1982. 

Figure 14 shows the approximate 95-pct confidence 
limits for each estimate of the work force population propor- 
tion n T Again, the solid line (n T ) is the same as P T in figure 
13 except that the scales of the abscissa and ordinate have 
been changed. 



23 



Table 6 lists the recommednations included in the 
tailored model for company W, the point value assigned to 
each, and the points attained. The maximum attainable 
score was 3,200. The 80-pct attainment level, previously 
established as the criterion for judging effective implemen- 
tation, was 2,560 points. The actual attainment by company 
W was 2,305 points, or 72 pet of the total attainable. 



The recommendations are self-explanatory as listed or 
are explained in the examples in appendix B. One, however, 
may deserve additonal explanation because it relates to a 
safety committee: "Create and use management- worker 
safety committee." The safety committee concept was not a 
specific feature of the model because it was not regarded as 
essential to effective health and safety management. 



TABLE 5.— Job performance sampling results, Company W 





Sample 
size (n) 






Proportion of jobs with deficiencies, by type 1 






Month 




Pa 


Pb Pc 




Pt 


n a 


Factor 


n b Factor n c Factor 


r»t 


Factor 



October 1981 

January 1982 

April 1982 

July 1982 

October 1982 

January 1983 

,p .. n a p _ n b 



66 
70 
56 
60 
58 
68 



54 


0.818 


52 


.743 


34 


.607 


31 


.517 


12 


.207 


8 


.118 


. n c 




n 





27 




0.409 


24 




.343 


20 




.357 


19 




.317 


13 




.224 


12 




.176 


_ n (a 


or 


b or c) 



39 
32 
20 
21 
11 
7 



0.591 
.457 
.357 
.350 
.190 
.103 



57 
54 
39 
36 
15 
13 



0.864 
.771 
.696 
.600 
.259 
.191 




TABLE 6.— Recommendations in tailored model 
for company W 



IO/8I I/82 4/82 8/82 IO/82 I/83 

FIGURE 13.— Proportions of jobs sampled at company W in 
which deficiency types P A , P B , P c , P T were observed. 



I.O 



8«/> 

oy 

oy 
zo 

OIL 

UJ 

Q 




I0/8I 



I/82 4/82 8/82 IO/82 I/83 



Assigned 
points' 



100 
100 



100 
50 



50 



50 


50 


50 


50 


50 


45 


100 


95 



100 
100 



FIGURE 14.— Job-deficiency 95-pct confidence limits for ,- T 
at company W. 



Recommendations 

Train and stress loss control management . . . 
Integrate safety and production in each job 

definition 

Identify and require superintendent respon- 
sibilities in safety and health 

Improved supervision of correct tool use in 

shop 

Acquire tool and require haul truck driver to 

remove rocks between dual tires . '. 

Prohibit Peterbilt dumping in jackknife posi- 
tion 

Install seat belt correctly on forklift trucks . . . 
Keep gate to cyanide storage area closed .... 

Improve storage of blasting materials 

Acquire and use machines to clear jams in 

crusher and hopper 

Require safety hat use by supervisors and 

workers 

Top managers to — 

Set example 

Budget safety time 

Review investigations 

Observe and give reinforcement 

Require near-miss investigations and dis- 
cussions 

Install bumper blocks at crusher hopper 

Install backguard on crusher hopper 

Provide and use machine seat safety belts . . . 
Improve housekeeping: 

Mill 

Laboratory 

Crusher 

Shop 

Remove extraneous material from machine 

cabs 

Improve roads, berms, and dumps 

Redesign and maintain runaway ramps 

Add apron to shop 

Construct machine "ready line" 

Add bridge crane to shop 

Create and use management-worker safety 

committee 

Train and direct: No pushing of machines with 

loader bucket teeth 

Train supervisors and worker members of 

safety committee in accident investigation . 
Stop low flying of airplane over mine building . 
Provide communications, transportation, and 

water supply for security man 

Improve methods of providing and servicing 

personal protection equipment 

Improve visitor control and training 

Improve recordkeeping and reporting 

Improve task training 



'Points assigned by research team as basis for evaluation. 



100 
50 



Attained 
points 



75 
25 



65 
40 



30 



100 
85 



100 


80 


100 


30 


100 


60 


100 


50 


100 


50 


50 


50 


50 


50 


50 


50 


100 


80 


50 


40 


100 


80 


100 


80 


50 


40 


100 


90 


100 


20 


50 


40 


100 


70 


100 


80 



80 
20 



100 


90 


50 


50 


100 


75 


100 


70 


100 


90 


100 


40 


100 


60 



24 



However, in the case of company W, there were several fac- 
tors which led to a safety committee recommendation. They 
were, in approximate order of importance: 

1. A short time before the model program implementa- 
tion began, the company had a union representation elec- 
tion. Among the workers complaints, during the union 
organizing effort, were those related to inadequate safety 
and poor management-labor communications. These com- 
plaints persisted after the election (in which union represen- 
tation was defeated). At least two of the leaders of a group 
highly critical of managment were advocates of a 
management-worker committee. 

2. Three of the supervisors subordinate to the resident 
manager were clearly managers of the autocratic type. The 
research team hoped, through training, to encourage the 
supervisors to try a supportive style. The management- 
worker safety committee would serve as a workshop for 
developing such a style. 

3. The resident manager was interested in developing 
any feedback mechanism that would help him understand 
the concerns of the workers. 

He accepted the recommendation for a committee with safe- 
ty responsibilities, but as it developed, it became a 
management-worker committee with several other kinds of 
responsibilities as well. 

Figure 15 gives the number of work-related injuries and 
illnesses in each month of 1982 that were reported as re- 
quired by 30 CFR 50. In 1981, company W did a very poor 
job of recordkeeping and reporting. Recordkeeping was ad- 
dressed early in the model implementation training, but the 
responsible superintendent did not take followup control ac- 
tion. The majority of the reports were not submitted until 
long after the 10-day reporting period specified in 30 CFR 
50. There was no downward trend of significance in the in- 
cidence rate; ten "reportables" occurred in the first half of 
the year and nine in the last half. 

Figure 16 shows the number of "lost time" days in 1982 
due to work-related injuries. The days lost for a given month 
on the graph are not the days lost during the month, but the 
total days lost at any time due to an injury in that month. 
For example, there was only one injury in June (fig. 15), but 
it resulted in more than 100 lost days -obviously not all in 
June. Clearly the last half of the year was an improvement 
over the first half. Only approximately one-third of the lost 
days for the year were in the last half. This is apparent from 
the cumulative curve. Some of the reason, undoubtedly, was 
management actions to control post-injury events, as at 
company E. But how much that effort contributed to the im- 
provement depicted by the graph cannot be determined. 

It has been noted earlier in this report that the oc- 
curence of accidental injuries is a probabilistic matter. It is 
also appropriate to view the severity of injuries as a pro- 
babilistic matter. During the evaluation process at company 
W, the research team recorded several instances of manage- 
ment action to track the post-injury events with a view to 
getting employees back to work as soon as possible. Actions 
of this type were not common previously -management had 
accepted almost without question an "excusal note" from 
any person with a medical profession title, or even an oral 
statement from the injured person. The new control pro- 
cedures certainly did what they were intended to do in some 
cases: They got people back to work and off worker compen- 
sation sooner. "Severity," as measured by the 30 CFR 50 
method, was reduced, and the employer's loss due to injuries 




_1 
< 
H 
O 
r- 



Jan Mar May July Sept Nov Jan 



FIGURE 15.— Monthly MSHA reportable injuries and il- 
lnesses at company W, 1982. 





350 




300 


If) 




o 


250 


TJ 




uJ 


200 


S 




\- 


I 50 


*: 




o 


100 



50 



! I I I I 


1 1 I 1 1 1 




• 


Cumulat 


^9 




2v*^ 


•-- 




/ 


- 


/ 




/ 




/ 




/ • 




^.^ A 


_ 


•^ / \ 




/ / \ 




/jk / \ 




j/ ^J 


k Jto 


^ «--•/ • 




T T I I 1 


\r\ r i i i 



Jan 



Mar May July Sept Nov. Jan 



FIGURE 16.— Monthly work days missed by company W 
employees because of work-related injuries, 1982. 

was reduced. Whether the actual physical severity of in- 
juries was reduced is not known. 

The research team tried, as part of its model program 
implementation assistance, to stimulate supervisory in- 
terest in careful investigation and recording "noninjury" ac- 
cidents and near misses. However, the results fell short of 
expectations. Two of the superintendents appeared initially 
to regard proper investigation and reporting of injuries as 
onerous tasks that detracted from their ability to supervise 
their subordinates. In time, the utility of proper investiga- 
tion and reporting became apparent to managers, but the 
superintendents seemed reluctant to extend their accep- 
tance to noninjury accidents. Several months passed before 
reliable accident information began to flow to the resident 
manager -and this occurred only after he had made the 
matter a special subject at management meetings and had 
issued several written directives. Thus, the recorded data 
about equipment and facility damage accidents are not com- 
plete. However, working from the records that were made 
and from information collected informally and confirmed of- 
ficially, it was possible to prepare graphs and tables. About 
56 "noninjury" accidents occurred in 1982; this number was 
certainly the majority of the total accidents. Figure 17 
shows the number of accidents by month of occurrence, ex- 
cept that the number shown for February (15) is actually for 



25 



en 



60 



UJ 
Q 


50 


O 




O 




< 


40 


UJ 




o 




< 


30 


.■> 




< 




n 






20 


>- 




\- 




rr 




UJ 


10 


0_ 




O 




cr. 




a. 






- 


' ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 




^^r 


" 


X 




s 




,• 




S 




,• 


- 


Cumulative—^ 


_ 


„• 




,*" 


- 


J* 




_s 


_ 


• 




• 


- 


• 


- 


.Vr-t-^r-r-rr^ : 



Jan 



Mar May July Sept Nov Jan 



FIGURE 17.— Accidents resulting in equipment and/or 
facility damage at company W, 1982. 

January and February. There were several accidents for 
which the exact date could not be determined with certain- 
ty. The monthly average for March through December was 
approximately four accidents. For the year, there were at 
least three times as many noninjury accidents as there were 
injury-producing accidents. 

Table 7 gives some cost information about the 56 ac- 
cidents represented in figure 17. The "minimum direct cost" 
is the lowest available estimate of the cost of parts and labor 
to make necessary repairs. The minimum direct costs were 
provided by the maintenance superintendent, who obtained 
them from maintenance records which identified time 
charges for mechanics and parts withdrawn from, shop stock 
or acquired from the warehouse for each repair job. The 
minimum direct costs do not include direct supervisory 
labor costs, the wages of operators paid for periods of 
idleness due to accidents, or the value of lost production 
when machines were not available for production use. Also, 
no "indirect costs" appear on the table. Examples of these 
are indirect supervisory labor; loss due to partial use of 
machines because of poor line balancing, as when a shovel is 
damaged and its haul trucks are assigned to another shovel 
that already has enough trucks; and the cost of delays in the 
mining plan, as when blast hole preparation is delayed for 
several shifts because accidental damage to a drill has taken 
the drill out of service. An effort was made to determine a 
reliable estimate of the total accountable costs of the 56 ac- 
cidents. There were detailed discussions of the accidents 
and their consequences with supervisors and workers. The 
estimate finally developed was $235,950 of uninsured loss 
(not covered or deductible). 

TABLE 7.— Accidents resulting in equipment and/or facility 
damage, 1982 

Noninjury Minimum Production 
Machine type accidents direct cost' shifts lost 

Rock trucks 10 $ 5,050 4 

Ore haulers 8 11,925 26'/i 

Shovels 4 38,250 33 

Loaders 4 7,300 14 

Graders 4 3,325 8 

Bulldozers 4 750 Vh 

Drills 7 7,500 10 

Compressor-generator .... 2 250 
Pickup trucks and adminis- 
trative vehicles _ 13 5,350 

Total 56 $79,700 97 

'Operator wages and lost production value not included. 



Following the reasoning used in the management train- 
ing, it could be said that if company W was to achieve a 
planned profit of, say, 15 pet on operations in 1982, there 
would have to be an increase in the planned product sales of 
approximately $1,573,000 to "pay for" the unplanned costs 
of the accidents. (This reasoning is explained in the previous 
section, "Implementation of the Model Program.") 
The expectation model mentioned earlier (also in the im- 
plementation section) was used extensively in instruction 
and demonstration at company W. (It was used at company 
E also, but less frequently.) Two examples based on this 
model, one simple and one rather complex, are discussed in 
the following paragraphs. 

Early in the implementation, during a management 
training session, a foreman asked how a simple expectation 
calculation might be used to bolster the effort to encourage 
wearing of safety hats. Several of the supervisors attending 
the course were asked to give examples, from their own ex- 
periences, of injuries that probably would* have been 
prevented if the worker had been wearing a safety hat. A 
list of several such injuries was made, and estimates of the 
cost of each were discussed. A consensus estimate of the 
minimum cost (C) of such accidents at company W during a 
year was developed, along with a consensus estimate of the 
probability (p) of their occurrence. These estimates, C = 
$2,650 and p = 0.4, were used to calculate the expected cost 
if no corrective action (Aj) were taken (some workers not 
using hard hats) as follows: 



No corrective action, injuries occur 0.4 

No corrective action, injuries do not occur 6 

E(A,) = 0.4($2,650) + 0.6($0) = $1,060 



$2,650 




The costs to purchase additional safety hats was deter- 
mined, and $120 was added for "promotion costs." The total 
cost of the corrective action was estimated to be $600. A 
consensus estimate of the probability of head-related ac- 
cidents after taking the corrective action was developed (p 
= 0.01). Therefore, the calculation of the expected cost if 
corrective action (A 2 ) were taken was as follows: 



Corrective action taken, injuries 
occur 

Corrective action taken, no 
injuries occur 



0.1 $2,650 + 600= $3,250 

.9 600 

E(A ; ) = 0.1 ($3,250) + 0.9($600) = $865 



Thus, the expectation was that it would cost company W 
$l,060-$865,or$195more each year if no corrective action 
were taken. This $195 cost was equivalent to $1 ,300 in sales. 
The expected annual return of $195 on the $600 investment 
represents a 32.5-pct ROI. The payback period would be 
slightly more than 3 yr. These are all different ways of say- 
ing the same thing, but saying the same thing differently 
often stimulates interest and supportive discussion. 

The second example was a case of eliminating a safety 
problem by solving a production problem - that is, by "doing 
the job right." The ore mined by company W is crushed in a 
plant near the mine before it is hauled approximately 9 miles 
down the mountains to the leach pad area. The crushing 
facility is a choke point in the production process. If ore 
jams the bin or the primary crusher, there can be no ore 
flow until the jam is corrected. The scheduled crushing 
facility production is the facility's capacity of 300 mt/h. 



26 



Stoppages due to jams mean that some ore will not reach 
the leach pads as scheduled. Because the leaching process 
takes a long time, ore delays mean that the final product, 
dore, may not be produced at the rate projected. Thus, pro- 
duction is lost. 

During the initial safety and health audit and job perfor- 
mance sampling, it was observed that crushing facility jams 
were frequent and that the methods used to clear them were 
extremely dangerous. For example, a laborer, straddling 
the jaw crusher mouth while the crusher was operating but 
not actually crushing, lowered loader bucket teeth on a rope 
into the jaw through an opening in the jammed ore made by 
the laborer with a bar. The teeth helped the crusher jaws to 
"bite into" the large blocks of ore. The laborer did not wear a 
safety line and often worked alone. If the bucket teeth 
method did not work, a truck crane was moved into posi- 
tion, and slings were put around the large rocks that would 
not go through the crusher so they could be lifted out. There 
were ways to prevent this hazard, by keeping oversize rocks 
from reaching the crusher. These ways were being studied 
by company engineers, but they required major new con- 
struction. Another way to deal with the hazard was to pro- 
vide a machine that could clear the crusher and bin. Such 
machines are readily avalable. The basic design is a 
hydraulic arm with a hydraulic pick, a bucket, a spade, or 
claw at the end. 

An expectation analysis was based not on the safety 
problem, but on the production problem. Available records 
showed that at least 20 h of crusher production time was 
being lost monthly because of jams 5 months out of 7 and 
that approximately 10 h was being lost during each of the 
other 2 months. At 300 mt/h, 20 h of production represented 
6,000 mt of crushed ore, which would yield approximately 
$86,400 in final product, dore. In a year's time, the value of 
final product lost could be $1,036,800. It was estimated that 
a hydraulic cleaning machine would reduce the "20-lost-hour 
months" to 1 in 12, with the other 11 being "10-lost-hour 
months." Two machines, one for the jaw crusher and one for 
the feed bin, would cost $99,800. The expectation computa- 
tion is shown in table 8. E(A 2 ) is lower than E(A X ) by 
$227,311, suggesting that the $99,800 investment would 
pay for itself in 1 yr, and also result in a $127,511 gain in 
production. And not incidentally, the risks associated with 
the hazard would be removed. (The ore mined by company 
W contains more silver than gold, but the silver was not in- 
cluded in these conservative expectation computations.) The 
hydraulic machines were purchased and installed in 
September 1982, not because of the analysis in table 8, but 
because the resident manager and parent company produc- 
tion engineers were working on a very similar production 
improvement. 



TABLE 8.— Expectation computation to add hydraulic pick and 
shovel' to company W crusher 

Probability of Annual 
Eventuality occurrence net cost 

Action A, (no corrective action): 

20 h/month lost 0.714 $1,036,800 

10 h/month lost ,286 518 400 

E(A,)' NAp 888,538 

Action A, (corrective action): 

20 h/month lost .083 1,136,600 

10 h/month lost .917 618 200 

E(A,)' NAp 66l!227 

NAp Not applicable. 

'Cost of hydraulic pick and shovel: $99,800. 

'Expectation, E(A) = (probability of occurrence) (annual net cost) for 
situation where 20 h/month are lost to jams plus (probability of occur- 
rence) (annual net cost) for situation where 10 h/month are lost to jams. 



The research project manager made the last formal field 
trip to company W in March 1983. In connection with some 
training being done for new management people, the 
"payback" computation in table 9 was made. By that time, 
there were "before" and "after" data available that could be 
compared with the estimates used in the earlier expectation 
model. The computation helped to illustrate the use of the 
expectation model and to demonstrate a general truth: Fre- 
quently a safety problem can be solved by solving a produc- 
tion problem. The payback period in this case was less than 
2-V2 months. 



TABLE 9.— Payback-period computation for hydraulic pick and 
shovel for company W crusher 

Total time 
crusher inoperable 
due to rock jams, h 

Prior to installation of pick and shovel: 

Feb. 1982 20.65 

Mar. 1982 20.35 

Apr. 1982 24.95 

May 1982 22.45 

June 1982' 11.38 

July 1982' 14.67 

Aug. 1982 23.23 

Total, Feb-Aug. 1982 137.68 

Av, Feb-Aug. 1982 19.67 

After installation of pick and shovel 
(Sept. 13, 1982): 

Sept. 1982 8.68 

Oct. 1982 13.07 

Nov. 1982 10.40 

Dec. 1982 13.64 

Jan. 1983 5.02 

Feb. 1983 7.00 

Total, Sept. 1982-Feb. 1983 57.81 

Av, Sept. 1982-Feb. 1983 9.64 

Hours "saved" after installation (compared with 
Feb. -Aug. 1982 av hours inoperative): 

Sept. 1982 10.99 

Oct. 1982 6.60 

Nov. 1982 9.63 

Total, Sept.-Nov. 1982 27.22 

Cost (in production hours) of hydraulic 

machinery 2 23.10 

'Tonalite ore. 

'Hours of production = cost of hydraulic machines ($99,800)/value of 
production ($4,320/h). Value of production = scheduled production (300 
mt/h) x gold content (0.06 oz/mtAu) x gold price ($400/ozAu). Since the 
average number of hours of production lost per month was 9.64, and the 
cost of the hydraulic equipment was equivalent to 23.10 h of production, 
the payback period = 23.10 h ■=■ 9.64 h/month = 2.40 months. 



WORK FORCE COMPARISONS 

The evaluation results are somewhat more meaningful 
if one understands some of the differences in the 
characteristics of the two work forces. Almost all of the 
company E employees grew up in the region of the mine and 
live less than 50 miles from their work, but only a very small 
fraction of the comapny W employees are natives of the 
region where that company is located. Nearly all of the com- 
pany E employees call themselves miners -their chosen oc- 
cupation. Most of the company W employees do not call 
themselves miners. They are machine operators, construc- 
tion workers, ranchers, laborers, etc., who happen to be 
working in a mine. The company E employees generally 
plan to work there as long as they can. Many of the company 
W employees have plans to go elsewhere at some specific 
time, usually within a year or two. Several of them are col- 
lege students, working as miners to get money to use to 
return to school. 

The conventional wisdom is that absentee rates and 
turnover rates go hand in hand; that is, a mine with a higher 



27 



turnover rate will have a correspondingly high absentee 
rate. A common explanation is that absenteeism is a symp- 
tom of job dissatisfaction and that quitting (turnover) is but 
a stronger manifestation of that dissatisfaction. In the case 
of companies E W, the company with the higher turnover 
rate had the lower absentee rate. The absentee data for both 
companies in 1982 are given in table 10. The overall 
absentee rates would have been very nearly the same in 
both companies had it not been for two union-related 
phenomena at company E: strikes and "paid personal leave." 
The labor contract for company E contains a provision that 
each worker is authorized 3 days a year of paid absence, 
called "personal leave." These are really three additional 
vacation days, although they are not thought of in that way 
by the workers. As one would expect, every hourly worker 
takes the three paid leave days. These days are included in 
the "absent" line in table 10. They represent nearly as many 
hours absent (approximately 7,400 h) as the grievance 
strikes. Together these two phenomena accounted for ap- 
proximately 15,500 h absent, or nearly IVz worker-yr. 

TABLE 10.— Overall absentee rates, 1982 

Company W Company E 

Hours: 

Scheduled 233,925 760,150 

Worked 226,804 722,812 

Absent, total ' 7,121 37,347 

Absent due to strikes 3 NAp 8,120 

Percent of scheduled hours absent . . . 3.04 4.91 

NAp Not applicable. 

'Includes all reasons except holidays and vacations. 

illegal grievance strikes. 

Figure 12 showed the "lost days" due to work-related in- 
juries in company E. The 1982 total was 639 days', or 5,112 
h. This number is only 13.7 pet of the total hours absent in 
1982 for company E (table 10). Figure 16 showed the "lost 
days" due to work-related injuries in company W. The 1982 
total was 329 days, or 2,632 h. This number is 37 pet of the 
total hours absent shown in table 10 for company W. 

Table 11 gives the 1982 turnover data for both com- 
panies. Company W, with only one-third the number of 
employees in company E, replaced 80 pet more employees 
during 1982. Company E replaced approximately 1 
employee in 10. Company W replaced nearly 6 in 10. Com- 
pany E's turnover rate was mostly a result of involuntary 
termination: the company was discharging people who had 
the poorest job performance and reliability records. Com- 
pany W's turnover rate was related more to voluntary ter- 
minations, although that company was also discharging 
many employees who had poor job performance and 
reliability records (more than 2 out of every 10 employees). 



TABLE 11.— Work force turnover, 1982 

Company W Company E 

Average total employment 340 113 

Turnover' 35 63 

Total turnover rate pet. . 10.3 55.8 

Voluntary turnover rate pet.. 1.5 34.5 

Involuntary termination rate ... .pet. . 8.8 21.2 

'Number of persons whose employment was terminated and for 
whom replacements were hired. 

The turnover in management positions was high at both 
companies. By mid- 1982, all company W supervisors on the 
payroll at the time (the resident manager, the three 
superintendents, and four key foremen) had received some 
of the model program training. Less than a year later, only 



the resident manager and one foreman who had been 
demoted to a nonsupervisory job remained on the payroll. 
Excepting the top manager, there had been 100-pct turn- 
over in management. At company E, the management turn- 
over was not as large, but was still significant. The top 
manager, the preparation plant foreman, and the surface 
drilling foreman were discharged in April 1982, when model 
program implementation was just getting "up to speed." 
The surface maintenance supervisor (master mechanic) 
resigned a few months later. It is tempting to speculate that 
the model programs at both companies would have been 
even more effective if management turnover had not been 
so high. 

WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES 

Before the model program was introduced, neither com- 
pany E nor company W devoted much attention to keeping 
records of illnesses that may have been job related. Atten- 
tion to these records was still lacking during the model im- 
plementation and evaluation. The data the research team 
was able to acquire came mostly from two sources: workers 
compensation claims and interviews with workers who had 
been absent or had required medical attention, or both, 
due to an alleged job-related illness. 

Tables 12 lists all of the illness cases at both companies 
about which information was obtained. The cases are placed 
in the codes given in 30 CFR 50.6(b)(7) for reporting on the 
MSHA form 7000-1. The three columns in table 12 titled 
"Claimed," "Verified," and "Reportable per 30 CFR 50" 
reflect actions taken to sort out those claimed illnesses that 
should be reported to MSHA. 30 CFR 50.2(b) reads, (" 'Oc- 
cupational illness' means an illness or disease of miner which 
may have resulted from work at a mine or for which an 
award of compensation is made." The part about an award 
of compensation is clear enough, but the phrase "may have 
resulted" is more difficult to work with. The first thing 
management must do is determine whether the illness or 
disease claimed actually exists. If a medical authority 
verifies the illness or disease, or if the miner is observed to 



TABLE 12.— Claimed job-related illnesses, companies E and 
W, 1982 

Reportable 
Claimed Verified per 30 CFR 50 

Code 21, occupational skin 
diseases or disorders: 

Chemicals 1 1 1 

Coal 1 

Fuels and lubricants 1 1 

Codes 22 and 23, dust disease of 
the lungs and respiratory 
conditions due to toxic agents: 

Dust (other than coal) 2 

Coal dust 1 

Chemicals 1 1 1 

Welding fumes 3 1 1 

Code 24, poisoning: 

Lead 2 

Mercury 2 

Cyanide and other 2 

Code 26, disorders associated 
with repeated trauma: 

Pain' 2 1 

Personal protection equip- 
ment irritation 1 1 

Code 29, all other occupational 
illnesses: 

Alcoholism' 4 4 

Stress' 5 5 

'Possibly noise related. 

'Not usually considered job-related illnesses. Not covered in 30 CFR 
50.20-6. 



28 



be ill or in pain, there is seldom any further question. If 
neither a medical opinion nor information from direct obser- 
vation is available, management usually assumes that the ill- 
ness or disease is ficticious. Sometimes, even with verifica- 
tion and acknowledgment that the illness may be work- 
related, there remains a question about the reporting re- 
quirement. An example is the "fuel and lubricant" case in 
table 12, under code 21. On a Friday, a mechanic was work- 
ing with some special lubricant. An hour or so later he 
developed a rash on his hands, arms, and parts of his face. 
The container for the lubricant carried a warning about the 
possibility of skin irritation. First aid was administered. The 
mechanic continued to work through the shift. Saturday and 
Sunday were not scheduled workdays for him. He returned 
to work on Monday. The rash had almost cleared up. The ill- 
ness was not reported on MSHA form 7000-1, although 
there was some argument among managers about whether 
it should have been. 

The six code-24 poisoning cases were the subject of ex- 
tensive medical analyses which concluded that the illnesses 
did not exist. Company management wanted very much to 
know the truth so that the health protection procedures 
could be changed if necessary. It is possible that the workers 
may simply have feared that they had, or were about to 
have, medical problems and were seeking the truth, too. The 
claims occurred very soon after some health training for 
mill and laboratory workers had been completed and 
management had begun a rather elaborate environmental 
monitoring procedure. Not long before, MSHA had cited the 
company for lack of adequate controls, protection equip- 
ment, and monitoring. Several workers had made alarmed 
inquiries about their health risks to MSHA. 

The several cases of alcoholism and stress were included 
under code 29, although there were many differences of 
opinion about that, too. One of the participating companies, 
and its parent company, sent two of the alcoholics to receive 



special treatment for several weeks each. The treatment 
was very expensive, but apparently also very successful. 
One of these treated workers retired because of heart 
disease a couple of months after he returned. The other one 
was working well, through the end of the model program 
evaluation. The other two reported alcoholics have never 
received any treatment, as far as is known. Their 
employers, the participating companies, did not offer them 
help apparently because they never acknowledged that they 
had a disease and never asked for treatment. 

The five stress cases were verified by observation and the 
statements of the affected employees, although only one of 
them ever used the word "stress." One haul truck operator 
had two minor equipment-damage accidents on a single 
night shift. The safety official, who knew him well, rode 
with him for an hour or two following the second accident. 
The operator rather suddenly "blurted out," "I can't keep my 
mind on the job." He then told of several serious family 
problems and how his work obligations affected his ability to 
deal with them. Another equipment operator was 
distraught to the point of sobbing and vomiting. After a long 
talk he said, "I am making myself sick with worry." The 
operator said he worried about his relationship with his 
supervisor and the possibility that the company would be 
sold and the supervisor would get a promotion that would 
make his situation even worse. (The parent company had 
publicly announced an intent to sell the company if an ac- 
ceptable offer was received. It was also true that the super- 
visor had threatened the employee with discharge if the 
supervisor received the promotion he was trying to get.) 
During the research, it was observed that where the 
autocratic style of management was practiced, there 
seemed to be a higher incidence of stress and stress-related 
health problems than where the supportive style was prac- 
ticed. 



PROJECT OVERVIEW 



Much time was devoted to understanding each com- 
pany. More than 90 worker-days of the researchers' time 
were spent at company W; this was approximately 
equivalent to one person's presence every working day for 
4.3 months. More than 170 worker-days were spent at com- 
pany E, the equivalent of one person's presence every work- 
ing day for 8 months. The employees of both companies 
cooperated fully with the researchers. There were no 
restrictions of any kind on where or when the research proj- 
ect manager went about the property, what he did, what he 
photographed, or to whom he talked. Any record requested 
was promptly made available. Thus, the researchers have a 
great deal of confidence in the validity of their findings. 



Implementation Time Requirements 

Although the model program may seem quite ordinary 
and simple, its implementation represented a very substan- 
tial change in management style and emphasis at the two 
part icipating companies. This may explain why it took much 
longer to put the concepts into practice and to achieve a 
reasonable semblance of the five previously described fun- 
damental conditions than the research plan allowed. The 



time required was much greater than either the research 
team or the company managers estimated. The managers of 
companies were well educated, capable, diligent, and stable 
people, but they were not thoroughly trained in manage- 
ment. It took them more than 6 months to put the model 
program concepts into practice. Nine to twelve months 
would probably be the minimum time required for full im- 
plementation in most mines, large or small. 

Using a Reifier 

The word "reifier" relates to materializing ideas, that is, 
making them real. The preferred mode of performance for 
person acting as a reifier is to bring up questions, assemble 
and report facts to management, facilitate communication, 
and teach. Although it is not essential that a reifier be used 
to help implement the model program, there are several ad- 
vantages to using one. A major advantage of using a reifier 
is that the program will probably be implemented 
significantly sooner than if a reifier is not used. The 
minimum amount of time a refier would be needed to assist 
the top manager with program implementation is about 60 
h. However, generally, the reifier would be very helpful to 
most managers for the full period of implementation. 



29 



CONCLUSIONS 



The model program described in this report is a very 
basic program about managment. It deals with essential 
conditions only. As stated in the introduction, the intent of 
this project was to identify and correctly define only those 
health and safety program elements that have potential for 
universal application throughout the mining industry. 

The costs of implementation are low because implemen- 
tation mostly involves getting management people to do bet- 
ter what they are already being paid to do. It is not harder 
work that is required, but "smarter work." Because im- 
plementation is inexpensive and the loss reduction is very 
substantial, the benefit-to-cost ratio is quite favorable. 

Not all of the improvements reported herein were made 
solely because of the model program implementation. Many 



of the improvements unquestionably would have occurred in 
the absence of the model program. Management's own ini- 
tiative, the parent companies' influence, MSHA activities, 
and employee suggestions and criticisms all contributed in 
varying degrees. In the view of the researchers, it did not 
matter how an action got started. What mattered for 
evaluation purposes was whether the action was compatible 
with the model program concepts and what the result was. 
The dramatic improvements observed at both com- 
panies during the course of this study strongly suggest that 
if the model program described herein is thoroughly 
understood and conscientiously implemented, it will 
significantly reduce injuries, illnesses, equipment damage, 
production losses, and other unplanned costs. 



REFERENCES 



1. National Safety Council. Accidents Facts. 1980, 97 pp. 

2. Woodward Associates, Inc. Research To Improve Health and 
Safety Programs in the Mining Industry (contract H0308076). 
BuMines OFR 6-85, 1983, 197 pp. 

3. Petersen, D. Techniques of Safety Management. McGraw- 
Hill, 2e ed., 1978, 298 pp. 

4. Chapman, L. P. How Do We Get Workers More Involved in 
Safety? Natl. Saf. News, v. 120, Sept. 1979, pp. 49-50. 

5. Hammer, W. Occupational Safety Management and 
Engineering. Prentice-Hall, 1976, 156 pp. 

6. Partlow, H. Today's Safety Professional. Prof. Saf., v. 22, 
Sept. 1977, pp. 40-42. 

7. Crapnell, S.G. Awards and Incentives Add Zest to Safety 
Performance. Occup. Hazards, v. 42, Aug. 1980, pp. 33-36. 

8. Gilmore, C. Accident Prevention and Loss Control. Am. 
Manage. Assoc, 1970, 207 pp. 

9. Hampton, D. Contests Have Side Effects, Too. CA Manage. 
Rev., v. 12, No. 4 1979, pp. 286-294. 

10. Mims, A., and R. DeReamer. Are Safety Committees 
Useful? Job Saf. and Health, v. 4, Mar. 1974, pp. 22-23. 

11. Dale, E. Management Theory and Practice. McGraw-Hill, 2d 
ed., 1969, 786 pp. 

12. Lippert, F. The Importance of Upper Management's Com- 
mitment to Safety. J. Am. Soc. Saf. Eng., v. 13, May 1968, pp. 
14-19. 

13. Shaw, C. Personal Responsibility for Mine Safety. Min. Con- 
gr. J., v. 66, Nov. 1980, pp. 49-52. 

14. Walters, C. Management of the Safety and Health Function 
To Help Attain Productivity Objectives. J. Am. Soc. Saf. Eng., v. 
19 Sept. 1974, pp. 39-43. 



15. Palisano, P. For Added Dimension in Accident Prevention 
Analyze the Near-Miss. Occup. Hazards, v. 42, Aug. 1980, pp. 
51-53. 

16. Joens, D.W. Implementing a Safety Audit. J. Am. Soc. Saf. 
Eng, v. 18, Nov. 1973, pp. 20-23. 

17. Woodward Associates, Inc. Research Study To Determine 
the Applicability of New Methodologies in Mine Accident Investiga- 
tions. Ongoing BuMines contract JO308008; for inf., contact J.M. 
Peay, TPO, Ind. Saf. and Training Systems Group, BuMines, Pitt- 
sburgh, PA. 

18. Maslow, A. Motivation and Personality. Harper & Row, 
1954, 276 pp. 

19. Heinrich, H.W. Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific 
Approach. McGraw-Hill, 1959, 267 pp. 

20. National Safety Council. One Measure of Work Accident 
Cost: Lost Profits. Coal Min. News., v. 16, May 1979, p. 3. 

21. Woodward Associates, Inc. Haulage Truck Training 
System. Ongoing BuMines contract J0387221; for inf., contact W. 
J. Wiehagen, TPO, Ind. Saf. and Training Systems Group, 
BuMines, Pittsburgh, PA. 

22. Development of Materials and Strategies for 

Pre-Shift Equipment Inspection (contract HO377101). Volume 2. 
Appendixes. BuMines OFR 139(2)82, 1977, 242 pp.; NTIS PB 
82-259227. 

23. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Safety and Health Re- 
quirements Manual. 1981, 342 pp. 

24. Church, H. Excavation Handbook. McGraw-Hill, 1981, 878 
pp. 



30 



APPENDIX A.— EXCERPTS FROM TAILORED MODEL 
PROGRAM, COMPANY E 

1. Comment: The majority of the (mining company E) people with whom there were discussions reflected views of safety 

(and loss control generally) as a consideration distinctly separate from, and sometimes in conflict with, pro- 
duction. 

Recommendation: Such views should be changed through top management direction, loss control training of super- 
visors, and regular discussions of the cost and other productivity-related facts of accidents and near misses 
at management meetings. 

Management decision: Recommendation accepted. 

Priority: 1 yr 

Points: 100 

2. Comment: The jobs at both worker and working foreman levels are not clearly and fully defined in writing, with health 

and safety aspects integrated with other performance expectations. It is apparent that the present 
management policy is to integrate production and safety considerations in each job. The introduction to the 
(mining company E) "Safety Guide" states, "It is not our intent to place the well-being of our employees 
secondary to production considerations. Rather, it is our objective to incorporate good work procedures 
and practices into each work phase." 

Recommendation: It is essential that supervisors define exactly the performance expectations of each job. Make 
plans to prepare a written job definition for every job. For mobile machine operators, the manufacturer's 
operating instruction manual serves well as a foundation. But these manuals must be supplemented by local 
production procedures, State and MSHA standards, company policies, and other related information. For 
other jobs, a job description should be prepared with the participation of workers and supervisors. 

Management decision: Recommendation accepted. 

Priority: 1 yr. 

Points: 100 

3. Comment: Several (mining company E) supervisors appeared to believe that the safety officer has the primary respon- 

sibility for safety and health matters, and that their own responsibilities (the supervisors') are primarily for 
production. 
Recommendation: A safety officer position, full or part-time, should - 

• Be filled by a person qualified by experience, training, personality, and interest in the work. (The pre- 
sent part-time safety officer appears to be so qualified). 

• Report directly to the general manager. (The present safety officer position reports in this way, accord- 
ing to the organizational chart). 

• Have a title such as "assistant for loss control" or "assistant for safety, health, and security," indicating 
a direct relationship with the responsibilities commonly assumed to be a "safety officer's job". 

• Have a written job description that makes clear that the primary responsibility for safety, health, and 
loss control rests with line supervisors; that the duties of this job are those which augment the top 
manager's capability to deal with loss control policy and supervision; and that the official provides 
technical assistance to the line managers in carrying out their responsibilities. 

• Be clearly defined in terms of the percentage of time that will be devoted to safety, health, and loss and, 
if not full-time, have clearly defined additional duties and related reporting channels. 

• Have a salary range that reflects the top management expectations with respect to productivity and 
profitability contributions. 

Management decision: Recommendation accepted. 
Priority: 3 months 
Points: 100 

4. Comment: There were some work practices observed at (mining company E) that had a high probability of producing 

personal injury or other losses. Their existence provides evidence that supervisors (and workers) do not 
have highly developed safety awareness and that safety is not always given the same emphasis as "getting 
on with the job." In most cases, job production would be improved if the job was done in a better (safer) 
way. 

Recommendation: The specific work practice examples A, B, and C, described below, should be corrected by ap- 
propriate supervisors. In addition, these examples should be used in training sessions, not to criticize in- 
dividual actions, but to emphasize the risks of poor work practices and the need for careful job definition 
and close supervision. 

Management decision: Recommendation accepted. 

Priority: Example A, 100 
Example B, 100 
Example C, LOO 

Example A: 30 CFR 75.523-2 requires that self-propelled electric face equipment be equipped with a bar or lever for 
quick de-energizing of the tramming motors. The bar or lever can move only 2 in, with no more than 15 lbf 
necessary to cause de-energizing. The bar or lever is commonly called the panic bar. 



31 



On three of the five electric underground machines checked during the safety audit, the panic bar did 

not 

de-energize the machine. The primary reason was bending or other distortion of the bar assembly, which 

rendered it incapable of depressing the panic button. 

It is a very dangerous practice to fail to maintain emergency equipment. Emergency devices should 

function reliably on those infrequent occasions when they are needed if serious consequences are to be 

avoided. All such equipment should be inspected and tested by the operator at the start of each shift, and 

repaired as necessary. 

Example B: The company "Safety Guide" has the following rule on page 4: "Fire fighting equipment shall 
be maintained at all times on heavy equipment. Extinguishers which have been discharge should be 
reported to the foreman." During the safety audit, several fire extinguishers on machines were observed to 
be partially discharged. Apparently machine operators are not inspecting and reporting regularly. 

Example C: Arc-welding operations were being conducted in a room that contained flammable refuse and liquids. 
The welding was not well ventilated or shielded, a violation of 30 CFR 77.408, as well as generally recom- 
mended industrial practice and the parent company's "Safety Rule Book." 



5. Comment: 



Most subordinate supervisors have not received specific training in loss control management or otherwise 
devoted time to study or think about this subject. Generally, subordinate supervisors will emulate the ex- 
ample set by the top manager. They may be induced to not merely support, but to lead health, safety, and 
general loss control management activities through a combination of training and repeated encouragement 
by the top manager. 

Recommendation: Schedule loss control training for salaried and hourly supervisors. All supervisory personnel 
should participate. The top manager's participation is especially important. He can provide reinforcing and 
clarifying comments, especially those related to his own plans for operations. His active role in discussions 
will encourage others to participate, thereby enchancing the learning experience for everyone, including 
the instructor. 

Management decision: Recommendation accepted. 

Priority: 6 months 

Points: 100 



Several other excerpts from company E's tailored model program are given in the final project report (2). 



32 



APPENDIX B.— EXCERPTS FROM TAILORED MODEL PROGRAM, COMPANY W 

1. Comment: The jobs at both worker and working foreman levels are not clearly and fully defined in writing, with health 

and safety aspects integrated with other performance expectations. 

Recommendation: Make plans to prepare written job definitions for every job. For mobile machine operators, the 
manufacturer's operating instruction manual serves well as a foundation, but these manuals must be sup- 
plemented by local production procedures, State and MSHA standards, company policies, and other related 
information. For other jobs, a job description should be prepared with the participation of workers and 
supervisors. 

Management decision: Agree with recommendation. The research team will prepare drafts, working from 
references, comments of workers on what they perceive their jobs to be, and comments of working 
foremen. The draft will be reviewed and supplemented or otherwise modified as appropriate by 
superintendents. The final drafts will be reviewed and approved by the resident manager. 

Priority: 9 months 

Points: 100 

2. Comment: A formal policy statement of the manager's commitment to safe operations is a necessary, but not suffi- 

cient, manifestation of such commitment. Subordinate supervisors and workers judge the manager's true 
concern for health, safety and general loss control primarily from observation of his actions. 
Recommendation: The resident manager should influence the "safety climate" (at mining company W) through the 
following actions: 

• Always wearing personal protection equipment (hard hat, safety glasses, safety shoes, and hearing pro- 
tection, in high-noise areas) whenever he is outside of his office. 

• Budgeting his time so that he devotes at least 10 pet of his normal work week (4 h) to participation in 
loss control activities. Specifically, he should - 

a. Conduct periodic health and safety "spot" inspections. 

b. Lead at least one departmental worker safety meeting each month. Explain policy changes and 
future plans and discuss recent accident and near misses. Encourage comments and suggestions 
from the workers, write them down, and report later what action was taken on each. 

c. Visit the scene of every accident and discuss the circumstances with those involved in a "fact- 
finding, not fault-finding" mode. 

d. Observe workers performing their duties, compliment those who are working safely and acting to 
reduce losses (positive reinforcement). Suggest or demonstrate changes in work practices to those 
who are not working safely and acting to reduce losses. 

Management decision: Agree with the recommendation and will implement immediatly. 

Priority: 1 month 

Points: Set example, 100 

Budget safety time, 100 

Review investigations, 100 

Observation and reinforcement, 100 

Near miss investigations, 100 

3. Comment: The most obvious, and perhaps the most serious, hazards are at the crushing plant. Two, for example, are 

related to the design of the primary crusher feed hopper and its grizzly, which stops some rocks that should 
pass and passes some that should not be passed. Thus, there is a rock removal task and a crusher clearing 
task, which are hazardous. On two occasions, workers were observed clearing a jam in the primary jaw 
crusher at the crushing plant. Each time the task took nearly 2h-2h during which no ore moved through 
the plant. The task was done by a laborer straddling the operating crusher mouth and using a bar and 
bucket teeth on ropes as his tools. He wore no safety line. This is not only a very dangerous way to clear the 
crusher, but also a very inefficient one. Several serious injuries were inflicted on workers using a bar in an 
operating crusher in 1980, and at least one of them was at an installation of company W's parent company. 
This is an example of a very hazardous work practice made "necessary" by poor facility design and failure 
to provide proper tools for the task. There is no "bumper block" or other restraint to keep the loader from 
being driven into the grizzly. There is no back guard or rear apron on the hopper to reduce the possibility of 
rocks bouncing off the grizzly and onto equipment and workers below in the primary crusher area. (The 
area is roped off at ground level to discourage trespass some of the time). 

Recommendation: Management should make removal or reduction of the obvious hazards a top priority. (Mining 
company W) and (parent company) engineers were working on crushing plant production problems in 
November. Detailed discussions with the engineers indicated that they understood the hazards described 
and would include plans for their removal or reduction in their overall facility improvement plans. This is a 
case in which sound solutions to the production problems will also solve many of the safety problems. 

Priority: 9 months 

Points: 100 



33 



4. Comment: Some machines require seat belt maintenance before actions to encourage seat belt use can have any mean- 
ing. For example, (one truck) has the seat belt improperly mounted (to the frame rather than to the spring 
seat). (Another truck) has a seat belt only on the passenger seat. Several machines have installed belts 
which are very dirty and in very poor condition. 

Recommendation: Inspect all machines for properly installed seat safety belts. 

Management decision: Agree with recommendation. 

Priority: 1 month 

Points: 100 



5. Comment: Dump areas and haul roads need good berms to reduce dumping and hauling hazards. Less stable dump 
areas, such as on recently dumped top soil, need higher and wider berms than more stable dump areas. 
Steep haul roads require good "runouts," or deceleration ramps (soft or hard), for emergencies such as 
brake failure. Generally, waste dump maintainers were observed to maintain berms well, but there were 
several exception. The top soil dump berm was not as wide or high as it should be in some places. Several 
short sections of steep haul road are without berms. Some of the deceleration ramps on the main road be- 
tween the crusher and leach area are of questionable design (too steep, too short, etc.), and a few had the 
approach obstructed by the results of grader or snow plow work. 

Recommendation: State in writing, a clear policy on berm construction and maintenance on dumps and haul roads. 
Have an engineering analysis of the deceleration ramps done. Make any design and contruction changes in- 
dicated by the analysis. 

Assure that all bulldozer, grader, and loader operators who construct berms are trained to make them at 
least as high as the axle of the largest truck at (mining company W). 

Management decision: Agree with recommendations. 

Priority: 6 months 

Points: Berms, 100 

Redesign ramps, 100 

Several other excerpts from company W's tailored model program are given in the final project report {2). 



34 



APPENDIX C— JOB PERFORMANCE SAMPLING 



The job performance sampling procedure, one of the means used to evaluate the model health and safety program, is 
discussed in several sections of this report. This appendix is intended to give the reader more details about the procedure. 
The next page contains the form used to record observations. On it are given short explanations about how the samples were 
selected and what information was recorded. Sample entries are given on the right side of the form. On the pages following 
the sample form are examples of each of the three types of deficiencies that were recorded during the sampling. 



Job information 
Sample No. 

Job 

A 
Personal preparation 

B 

Equipment and tools 



Work procedures 



Comment 



Job Performance Sampling Form 

Observer's instructions 

(Systematic sampling used: every kth worker, with a random 
start. Note time.) 

(The job title and the type, model, and company number of the 
machine operated, if job is machine operator.) 

(Deficiencies in things for which the worker has sole respon- 
sibility. For example, proper clothing; safety shoes, safety 
hat, safety glasses, ear protection, and other special protec- 
tion items required by the job, including safety belt use; clean 
windows and mirrors, clear cab, etc.) 



(Deficiencies in things that worker alone cannot correct. Im- 
proper tool or equipment and machine condition. Preshift in- 
spection checklist items plus others of special interest. Ac- 
tions indicating poor task training, assignments, or supervi- 
sion.) 



(Observe work 5 to 10 min, or cycle of machine operation. 
Note deficiencies in environment, procedures, practices, 
work sequences, and especially hazards - things called unsafe 
acts and unsafe conditions, and not included in A and B. 
Generally, poor methods and conditions which relate to more 
than one job.) 



(Preliminary evaluation of importance of deficiency not 
previously noted or noted but not corrected, and action that 
should be taken and by whom. Optional for all except "immi- 
nent danger" items.) 



Sample entry 
#8 10:20 a.m. 



Truck driver, CAT 777, 
#60351 

Hard hat in poor condition; 
needs replacement soon. 



1 - Lenses on right and 
center white backup lights 
broken. 

2 -Fire extinguisher oh deck 
needs repair; extinguisher on 
floor of cab. 

1- Backed into loading point 
before loader had indicated 
desired position. 

2-Berm along haul road to 
upper waste area C inade- 
quate -too low and not con- 
tinuous. 

Cl: Corrected on spot by 
foreman. 

C2: Foreman told 
motorgrader operator to cor- 
rect by end of shift. 

and 

Bl and B2: Maintenance 
scheduled repair of lenses 
and extinguisher mount for 
night shift. 

A foreman to arrange issue 
of new hard hat next day 
shift. 



Examples of Type A Deficiencies (Employee Correctable) 

1 . Wearing improper clothing on the job. 

2. Failure to wear safety shoes in good repair. 

3. Failure to wear safety helmet in good condition. 

4. Failure to wear safety glasses where required. 

5. Failure to wear seat safety belt. 

6. Failure to use a safety line where required. 

7. Failure to wear hearing protection where required. 

8. Failure to have self-rescuer on belt underground. 

9. Failure to keep operator station and deck of underground machine clear and clean. 
L0. Failure to use installed lights on mining machine. 



35 



11. Failure to use water spray at face. 

12. Failure to move trailing cable correctly. 

13. Failure to use correct tool or part. 

14. Using machine incorrectly (for example, pushing another vehicle with bucket teeth). 

15. Speeding. 

16. Failure to yield right of way to loaded trucks. 

17. Failure to follow any task performance rule posted or included in training or direction. 

18. Keeping hand on roof drill while turning drill. 

19. Moving truck with body raised. 

20. Dumping truck with wheels turned or body not level. 

21. Unsafe handling of batteries. 

22. Improper use of compressed air. 

23. Improper care of welding lines and hoses. 

24. Opening acetylene cylinder valve more than one turn. 

25. Failure to keep compressed-gas cylinders upright and secured. 

26. Improper use of wire rope clamps and thimbles. 

27. Poor housekeeping in workplace. 

28. Improper use or storage of ether-based starting fluid. 

29. Improper disposal of salvagable items. 

30. Improper disposal of pressurized containers. 

31. Smoking in prohibited area. 

32. Carrying smoking materials underground. 

33. Drinking alcoholic beverages on property. 

34. Using recreational drugs on property. 

35. Failure to wear special protection equipment required for task. 

36. Operating a machine for which not trained and qualified. 

37. Unauthorized reading material in machine cab or other workplace. 

38. Failure to cut power and lock out before working on circuits. 

39. Failure to conduct proper inspection of machine each shift. 

40. Failure to report machine or equipment defects. 

41. Failure to keep windows, light lenses, and other glass clean. 

42. Tardiness in reporting to job. 

43. Failure to report an accident or near miss. 

44. Misuse of tools, equipment, or emergency supplies. 

45. Failure to block machines raised by jacks for repair. 

46. Failure to conduct a proper shutdown check. 

47. Moving ahead of supported roof. 

48. Loading or unloading moving mantrip or supply cars. 

49. Failure to stop conveyor and lock out before working on it. 

Examples of Type B Deficiencies (Employer Correctable) 



1. Failure to provide safety hat. 

2. Failure to provide suitable safety glasses. 

3. Failure to fit, repair, and replace personal protective equipment. 

4. Failure to install seat safety belts correctly. 

5. Failure to replace damaged or very dirty seat belts. 

6. Failure to maintain ladders on surface machines. 

7. Failure to provide ear protection and hygiene training. 

8. Failure to provide safety lines and belts. 

9. Failure to repair reported machine defects. 

10. Failure to provide correct tools or parts. 

11. Assigning worker to task for which he or she has not been trained. 

12. Directing worker to use incorrect tool, defective machine, or badly demaged equipment. 

13. Failure to post traffic rules. 

14. Failure to maintain workplace lighting. 

15. Failure to train worker for tasks specifically part of job. 

16. Failure to provide appropriate hazard training (for example: in use of compressed air and ether-based starting 

fluid). 

17. Allowing short cuts not permitted in job definition. 

18. Failure to perform required workplace and machine inspections. 

19. Failure to report and act on tardiness or absence. 

20. Ignoring accident or near miss reports. 

21. Ignoring evidence that worker is ill, "hung over," or otherwise partially incapacitated. 

22. Failure to correct improper performance of task. 

23. Failure to provide, and check periodically, lock out devices. 



36 



24. Allowing workers to move under unsupported roof. 

25. Failure to require proper preparation for underground welding (with respect to fire extinguisher, rock dust, etc.). 

26. Permitting welding, drilling, or cutting ROPS supports. 

27. Permitting work on live electrical circuits. 

Examples of Type C Deficiencies (Common to Several Jobs; Employer Correctable) 

1. Failure to monitor noise level in suspect area. 

2. Failure to install noise suppression or require hearing protection in high-noise area. 

3. Failure to check escape tunnels, etc., regularly. 

4. Failure to require berms at dumps and along haul roads. 

5. Allowing deviations from approved roof control plan. 

6. Failure to conduct appropriate air contamination measurements. 

7. Permitting hazardous practices to be specified as normal practice in work procedure definition. 

8. Inappropriate truck queuing procedure at load points. 

9. Inadequate fire-suppression and emergency medical capability available. 

10. Inadequate policy for emergency management on holidays and weekends. 

11. Failure to specify proper personal protective equipment for every job in the work procedures. 

12. Failure to fully and correctly inform workers of any existing environmental or atmospheric conditions which may repre- 
sent hazards to their health or safety. 

13. Failure to provide proper security for workers' personal property and autos. 

14. Failure to provide safe man trips. 

15. Failure to provide adequate area lighting. 



US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1986-605 017/40.0026 INT.-BU.OF Ml N E S.P GH., P A. 28 278 






Il 



U.S. Department of the Interior 
Bureau of Mines— Prod, and Distr. 
Cochrans Mill Road 
P.O. Box 18070 
Pittsburgh. Pa. 15236 



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